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THE MYTH OF THE DOUBLE-EDGED
SWORD: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
NEUROSCIENCE EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL CASES
DEBORAH W. DENNO *
Abstract: This Article presents the results of my unique study of 800 criminal
cases addressing neuroscience evidence over the past two decades (1992–
2012). Many legal scholars have theorized about the impact of neuroscience
evidence on the criminal law, but this is the first empirical study of its kind to
systematically investigate how courts assess the mitigating and aggravating
strength of such evidence. My analysis reveals that neuroscience evidence is
usually offered to mitigate punishments in the way that traditional criminal
law has always allowed, especially in the penalty phase of death penalty trials.
This finding controverts the popular image of neuroscience evidence as a
double-edged sword—one that will either get defendants off the hook alto© 2015, Deborah W. Denno. All rights reserved.
* Arthur A. McGivney Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. This Article is
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of Criminal Law, Loyola University Chicago (School of Law and the Department of Criminal
Justice and Criminology), New York University School of Law (Hoffinger Criminal Justice Colloquium, Center for Research in Crime and Justice), Pace University School of Law, Southern
Methodist University Dedman School of Law, SUNY Buffalo Law School (Buffalo Criminal Law
Center), University of Richmond School of Law (Emroch Faculty Colloquy Series), RutgersCamden University School of Law (Rutgers Institute for Law and Philosophy), University of San
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University of Texas School of Law, and Yale Law School. I give special thanks to a superb set of
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entire project. With characteristic talent, Madhundra Sivakumar and Robert Yasharian created the
Article’s charts. I am indebted to five sources for research funding without which this project
could not have existed: Fordham Law School, the Proteus Action League, Atlantic Philanthropies,
the Reynolds Family, and the Arthur and Charlotte Zitrin Foundation. Terence Lenamon graciously provided helpful information on the Grady Nelson case. Members of the Boston College Law
Review gave outstanding editorial assistance. Any mistakes or misjudgments are my own.
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gether or unfairly brand them as posing a future danger to society. To the contrary, my study indicates that neuroscience evidence is typically introduced for
a well-established legal purpose—to provide fact-finders with more complete,
reliable, and precise information when determining a defendant’s fate. My
study also shows that courts accept neuroscience evidence for this purpose,
and in fact expect attorneys to raise this evidence when possible on behalf of
their clients. This expectation is so entrenched that courts are willing to grant
defendants their “ineffective assistance of counsel” claims when attorneys fail
to pursue this mitigating evidence. Meanwhile, my study also reveals that the
potential future danger posed by defendants is rarely a facet of cases involving
neuroscience evidence—again contradicting the myth of the double-edged
sword. The cases that do address future danger, however, offer fascinating insight into the complex legal issues raised by neuroscience evidence. As courts
continue to embrace neuroscience tools and techniques, the empirical data collected in my study provide a foundation for discussions regarding the use of
neuroscience evidence in criminal cases. The findings presented in this Article
will ensure that those discussions are grounded in fact rather than hyperbole.

INTRODUCTION
A little explanation can go a long way . . . the difference between life
1
and death.

In 2010, shortly after escaping from prison, John McCluskey killed a
retired couple in order to steal their camping trailer.2 The crime was horrific: McCluskey and two accomplices shot the defenseless couple inside their
trailer and then set their truck ablaze with their bodies inside. 3 Yet a jury
rejected the death penalty, instead sentencing McCluskey to life in prison
without the possibility of parole. 4 The jury’s life-over-death choice was
seemingly influenced by the defense’s introduction of brain scans indicating
substantial damage to McCluskey’s frontal lobe. 5 According to legal analysts, the jury viewed McCluskey’s brain abnormalities as a mitigating factor that decreased his level of culpability and ability to plan or intend such a

1

Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1249 (9th Cir. 2002).
See Third Superseding Indictment at 3, United States v. McCluskey, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1117
(2012) (No. 10-cr-02734), 2012 WL 6704922, at *3; Transcript of Record at 4558, McCluskey,
893 F. Supp. 2d at 1117 (transcript of trial on the merits).
3
See Transcript of Record, supra note 2, at 4558 (transcript of trial on the merits).
McCluskey was convicted in federal court of carjacking and two murders. See id. at 12031 (transcript of punishment phase).
4
See id. at 13049 (transcript of punishment phase).
5
Motion to Rebut Defendant’s Mental Health Expert Testimony at 3–4, McCluskey, 893 F.
Supp. 2d at 1117; Ruben C. Gur, Ph.D., Neurobehavioral Assessment of Mr. McCluskey (Oct. 2,
2013) (report submitted to Michael Burt, Attorney at Law) (on file with Author).
2
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crime, rather than as an aggravating factor that heightened his future danger
to society. 6
Courtroom battles over mitigating and aggravating evidence are a common aspect of capital cases, but the unprecedented use of neuroscience evidence in these battles has led to some striking outcomes.7 In 2010, for example, a judge ruled brain mapping evidence admissible for the first time, noting
its “ability to provide vital information on brain injury and impairment.” 8 The
defendant, Grady Nelson, was convicted in Miami of first degree murder after
stabbing his wife sixty times, and then also stabbing his step-children.9 Despite Nelson’s appalling crimes, the jury declined a death sentence,10 with
some jurors noting in post-verdict interviews that neuroscience evidence of
Nelson’s mental incapacity dissuaded them from issuing a death sentence. 11
The rising acceptance of neuroscience evidence has fueled heated debate
regarding its impact on the criminal justice system. 12 The criminal law has
focused on the human mind and mental states since the seventeenth century,
yet the field of neuroscience is relatively young. 13 The first use of the term
6
See Scott Sandlin, McCluskey Gets Life in Prison for Killing Couple, ALBUQUERQUE J.
(Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.abqjournal.com/318501/news/mccluskey-gets-life-in-prison-for-killingcouple.html, archived at http://perma.cc/M2BD-ZHEG; Greg Miller, Did Brain Scans Just Save a
Convicted Murderer from the Death Penalty?, WIRED (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.wired.com/
wiredscience/2013/12/murder-law-brain/, archived at http://perma.cc/W249-CBPV.
7
See generally Michael J. Saks, The Impact of Neuroimages in the Sentencing Phase of Capital Trials, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 105 (2014) (discussing the effect of supplementing neuroscience evidence with neuroscience imaging in the courtroom); O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging
and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265 (2008) (discussing and
critiquing then-current and aspirational uses of neuroscience in capital cases).
8
Judge Okays QEEG Evidence for Grady Nelson, PRWEB (Oct. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Judge
Okays QEEG Evidence] (citations and internal quotations omitted), http://www.prweb.com/
releases/GradyNelsonTrial/QEEGBrainMapping/prweb4718954.html, archived at https://perma.cc/
X2U3-QNWE?type=image; see Francis Shen, The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography: Navigating the Emerging Field of Neurolaw, 38 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 352, 352 (2010). The particular
brain mapping evidence in the Nelson case was quantitative electroencephalography (QEEG),
“[t]he computerized analysis that separates the EEG recorded on the scalp into wave frequency
components.” OWEN D. JONES ET AL., LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 764 (2014).
9
State v. Nelson, No. F05-846 (11th Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 2, 2010), archived at https://perma.cc/
7XA5-2JXG?type=pdf; Judge Okays QEEG Evidence, supra note 8; Miller, supra note 6. For
more information, see generally Transcript of Opening Statement, Nelson, No. F05-846, archived
at https://perma.cc/6TZZ-NZHA?type=pdf.
10
Transcript of Defense Closing Argument, Nelson, No. F05-846, archived at https://perma.
cc/M4ZU-ZGXM?type=pdf; Press Release, S. Fla. Reception Cntr. (Mar. 3, 2015), archived at
https://perma.cc/TP7N-TG8W?type=pdf; see also Miller, supra note 6.
11
Miller, supra note 6.
12
See generally Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes
Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775 (2004)
(discussing the key debates regarding the criminal law and neuroscience).
13
See Deborah W. Denno, Criminal Law in a Post-Freudian World, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV.
602, 609–13 [hereinafter Denno, Post-Freudian World] (discussing the evolution of mens rea);
Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV.
269, 269–314 (2002) [hereinafter Denno, Consciousness] (analyzing the historical development of
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neuroscience did not even occur until 1963.14 The term is defined in varying
ways, but the definition provided by the American Association for the Advancement of Science is representative: neuroscience is “the branch of life
sciences that studies the brain and nervous systems [including] . . . brain processes such as sensation, perception, learning, memory, and movement.” 15
Recent neuroscience research focuses on an even newer discipline—that of
cognitive neuroscience, which combines cognitive science, psychology, and
neuroscience to examine the mechanisms of the mind, such as motor function, language, higher cognitive functions, emotions, and consciousness.16
Key criminal law concepts of culpability depend on the internal workings of individuals’ minds. Revelations about a defendant’s level of intentionality or consciousness are just some examples of areas where new discoveries could improve the criminal justice system. 17 Yet, neuroscience evidence can be portrayed as a potential “double-edged sword: it may diminish
[a defendant’s] blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates that there
is a probability that he will be dangerous in the future.” 18 This Article refers
to this misconception as the “myth of the double-edged sword.” Specifically, much of the debate surrounding the intersection of neuroscience and the
criminal law centers on the mistaken assumption that neuroscience evidence
will abdicate violent criminals of all responsibility for their crimes—
especially those like McCluskey and Nelson. 19 In contrast, others fear that
conscious and unconscious thought processes as they pertain to the law); Definition of NeurosciONLINE
DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.
ence,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
com/dictionary/neuroscience, archived at http://perma.cc/3WTL-5B7J (last visited Mar. 11, 2015)
(providing that the “[f]irst [k]nown [u]se” of the term “Neuroscience” did not occur until 1963).
14
See MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, supra note 13; Definition of Neuroscience,
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/235290?redirectedFrom
=neuroscience#eid, archived at http://perma.cc/ZRY7-AS33 (last visited Mar. 11, 2015) (identifying the first known use of the term “neuroscience as a 1963 research program bulletin title”).
15
BRENT GARLAND, NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF
JUSTICE 206 (2004).
16
JAMIE WARD, THE STUDENT’S GUIDE TO COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 4 (2d ed. 2010).
17
See Denno, Post-Freudian World, supra note 13, at 640–44 (discussing state of mind, or
mens rea, as it is used to define criminal conduct by the Model Penal Code).
18
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 324 (1989); see also Owen D. Jones & Francis X. Shen,
Law and Neuroscience in the United States, in INTERNATIONAL NEUROLAW: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 349, 362 (T.M. Spranger ed., 2012) (“Using neuroscience evidence in capital sentencing . . . introduces a double-edged sword problem that multiple commentators have recognized. . . . That is, a brain too broken may be simply too dangerous to have at large, even if it is
somehow less culpable.”); Snead, supra note 7, at 1338 (Snead cautions against the use of neuroscience evidence in death penalty cases, despite its mitigating potential, because aspects of the
capital sentencing process “—most notably, the aggravating factor of future dangerousness—are
no friend to the capital defendant. In fact, they are often the gravest threat to his life.”).
19
For some extreme views on the use and impact of the neuroscience evidence introduced in
cases including those of John McCluskey and Grady Nelson, see Eric Markowitz, The New Murder Defense: My Brain Made Me Do It, VOCATIV (Nov. 13, 2013, 2:24 PM), http://www.vocativ.
com/culture/science/new-murder-defense-brain-made/, archived at http://perma.cc/V5FU-NDHP
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such evidence could bolster predictions of defendants’ purported future
danger to society, thereby unfairly generating longer prison terms or even
the death penalty. 20 Meanwhile, media accounts of some particularly controversial cases have alarmed the public with inaccurate narratives of how
courts use neuroscience evidence and how neuroscience fits into the framework of the criminal justice system. 21 The complexity of these legal issues
will only expand as the science progresses and becomes increasingly common in courtrooms. 22
Numerous scholars have offered insightful assessments of the legal
issues that arise at the intersection of law and neuroscience.23 The bulk of
(focusing on John McCluskey and arguing that neuroscience is infiltrating the criminal law to the
advantage of criminals far beyond what our current understanding of neuroscience should permit);
Priya Shetty, Law and Order: Blame It on the Brain, BBC (July 11, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/
future/story/20120710-blame-it-on-the-brain, archived at https://perma.cc/SV7C-RE99?type=pdf
(focusing on Grady Nelson and discussing a group of scientists and doctors who feel that at least
some neuroscience evidence is simply not well enough understood to be used conclusively in
courtrooms today).
20
See Nicholas Mackintosh, Guilty Minds, NEW SCIENTIST, Dec. 17, 2011, at 26–27 (“Rather
than such evidence serving to reduce a criminal’s sentence, one could argue that it might be used to
increase it, or at least influence decisions about release or parole.”); Peter McKnight, The Ethical
Minefield of Using Neuroscience to Prevent Crime (Part 2 of 3): Is It Moral to Make Changes to a
Person’s Brain If It Benefits Both the Offender and Society?, VANCOUVER SUN, Dec. 10, 2012,
http://www.vancouversun.com/health/ethical+minefield+using+neuroscience+prevent+crime+Part/7
674188/story.html, archived at https://perma.cc/9SSV-L97N?type=pdf (“[N]euroscience could indeed lead to defendants being found less blameworthy. But such evidence could also backfire, for
judges could conclude that the neuroscience shows the defendant is constitutively, irremediably dangerous, and hence must be locked away for a longer period of time to protect the public.”).
21
See Kate Kelland, Insight—Neuroscience in Court: My Brain Made Me Do It, REUTERS,
Aug. 29, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/29/us-neuroscience-crime-id
USBRE87S07020120829, archived at http://perma.cc/C4X2-42C5 (examining a number of extreme cases where neuroscience evidence has been used, branding neuroscience as the “my brain
made me do it” defense, and citing a number of sources arguing that neuroscience is being misapplied and far overextended in courts of law).
22
See generally Owen D. Jones et al., Law and Neuroscience, 33 J. NEUROSCIENCE 17624
(2013) (discussing the growth of neuroscience and the ways the criminal justice system can handle
it).
23
There is currently a multilayered debate among scholars regarding the impact cognitive
neuroscience will have on the law. Theoretically speaking, some scholars believe that cognitive
neuroscience will challenge our traditional notions of free will, which, in turn, will dramatically
alter the way society views criminal punishment. See Greene & Cohen, supra note 12, at 1784
(explaining that “free will as we ordinarily understand it is an illusion generated by our cognitive
architecture,” and since “retributivist notions of criminal responsibility ultimately depend on this
illusion,” they will give way to a criminal justice system based solely on consequentialism). But
see Stephen J. Morse, Avoiding Irrational Neurolaw Exuberance: A Plea for Neuromodesty, 62
MERCER L. REV. 837, 855 (2011) (arguing that “[g]iven how little we know about the brain-mind
and brain-action connections, to claim that we should radically change our picture of ourselves,
legal doctrines, and practices based on neuroscience is a form of neuroarrogance”); Amanda C.
Pustilnik, Violence on the Brain: A Critique of Neuroscience in Criminal Law, 44 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 183, 237 (2009) (“[The] claim that the criminal law can understand violence principally as
emerging from localized brain dysfunction in people who are neurobiologically distinct is simpler
than possible.”). Similarly, there is an ongoing debate regarding the specific practical applications
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the academic writing, however, has been confined to small-scale empirical
studies or to a handful of unusual cases, whether real or theoretical.24 This
focus by scholars on the outliers and unlikely cases tends to distort the dialogue on neuroscience with misconceptions about the actual impact of neuroscience on the law. 25 Until now, there has been no comprehensive nationwide account of how neuroscience is actually used to evaluate a defendant’s
mental state within a universe of criminal cases.26 With this Article, I seek
to fill that void. I have conducted an unprecedented empirical study (“Neuroscience Study” or “Study”) of all criminal cases (totaling 800 cases) that
addressed neuroscience evidence over the course of two decades (1992–
2012). The Neuroscience Study provides, for the first time, extensive and
systematic empirical data that show how neuroscience evidence is used in
courtrooms. These data enable us to look beyond assumptions and misconceptions, particularly the myth of the double-edged sword.
In presenting the results of the Neuroscience Study, I do not engage in
debates over the appropriate use of neuroscience evidence. That important
topic has been discussed in-depth elsewhere. 27 Instead, the Neuroscience
Study reveals the marked degree to which such evidence has been integrated into the criminal justice system in ways that have never before been documented or analyzed. The Study also uncovers a criminal justice system
that is surprisingly willing to accept and comprehend both the strengths and
of neuroscience evidence. For example, many scholars advocate the use of neuroscience evidence
by death penalty defendants to bolster their mitigation claims during sentencing. See John H.
Blume & Emily C. Paavola, Life, Death, and Neuroimaging: The Advantages and Disadvantages
of the Defense's Use of Neuroimages in Capital Cases—Lessons from the Front, 62 MERCER L.
REV. 909, 914 (2011) (explaining that neuroimaging “can make the difference between life and
death” in a defendant’s mitigation presentation); Adam Lamparello, Neuroscience, Brain Damage,
and the Criminal Defendant: Who Does It Help and Where in the Criminal Proceeding Is It Most
Relevant?, 39 RUTGERS L. REC. 161, 178 (2012) (arguing that neuroscience evidence of traumatic
brain injuries is “substantially relevant and probative” during the sentencing phase of a capital
trial, and that demonstrated injuries to the defendant’s frontal lobe and amygdala should warrant a
term of life in prison instead of the death penalty). But see Jones & Shen, supra note 18, at 362
(discussing the “double-edged sword problem”); Snead, supra note 7, at 1338 (emphasizing the
“threat” of the future dangerousness aggravator to capital defendants). For a parallel discussion
regarding the controversy surrounding the use of behavioral genetics in criminal law, see Deborah
W. Denno, Courts’ Increasing Consideration of Behavioral Genetics Evidence in Criminal Cases:
Results of a Longitudinal Study, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 967, 1008–27.
24
For the most thorough and recent overview of this research, see generally JONES ET AL.,
supra note 8.
25
For an example of such distortion, see Markowitz, supra note 19; see also Shetty, supra
note 19 (addressing previous scholarly attention to extreme views on the use and impact of neuroscience evidence).
26
In separate articles, Neal Feigenson and Carter Snead come the closest to offering such
published and systematic accounts. See Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence:
On the Admissibility and Persuasiveness of fMRI, 2 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 233, 233–55 (2006);
Snead, supra note 7.
27
See generally JONES ET AL., supra note 8.
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limitations of neuroscience evidence in ways that clearly discredit the myth
of the double-edged sword. Rather than simply furthering current theoretical debates, this Study suggests that the substance of such debates should
change. Indeed, the results of the Neuroscience Study spur a straightforward, yet perhaps unexpected, conclusion: the key question we should be
asking is not whether neuroscience evidence should be used in the criminal
justice system, but rather how and why.
In an effort to begin answering this how-and-why question, Part I of
this Article describes the Neuroscience Study and some of its most fundamental findings. 28 Neuroscience evidence is typically raised in cases where
defendants are facing a severe sentence, such as the death penalty, a life
sentence, or a substantial prison sentence. 29 Yet contrary to the myth of the
double-edged sword, the Study reveals that such evidence is most commonly introduced for an important yet relatively conventional purpose: as part
of an effort to mitigate a defendant’s sentence. 30 Indeed, this Study uncovers a criminal justice system that is willing to embrace innovative methods
of assessing defendants’ mental capabilities, and expects its attorneys to do
the same.
Part II of this Article focuses on this latter point—courts’ expectations
of attorneys. 31 Part II explains how the standards articulated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington32 are applied in the context of
neuroscience evidence and presents one of the Neuroscience Study’s most
striking findings: many courts not only expect attorneys to investigate and
use available neuroscience evidence when it is appropriate, but also penalize attorneys who neglect this obligation. In an effort to better discern the
parameters of courts’ requirements, Part II concludes by examining a number of cases in which courts found attorneys’ approaches to available neuroscience evidence to be ineffective.
Part III tests one the most widely held myths of the double-edged
sword—that prosecutors will use neuroscience evidence to fuel arguments
that a defendant is a future danger and therefore deserves death or extensive
incarceration. The Neuroscience Study’s findings are clear: neuroscience
evidence is only rarely used to argue a defendant’s future dangerousness.33
Yet the topic itself is more nuanced, and Part III concludes by warning attorneys of the contradictions that neuroscience evidence can bring.
28

See infra notes 34–68 and accompanying text.
See infra Chart 1. For the reader’s convenience, the charts discussed in this Article are
archived at https://perma.cc/7QV8-L8F8?type=pdf.
30
See infra Charts 6–7.
31
See infra notes 70–274 and accompanying text.
32
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (establishing the standards for evaluating attorneys’ performances on behalf of their clients).
33
See infra notes 276–448 and accompanying text (discussing future dangerousness).
29
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I. THE NEUROSCIENCE STUDY: 1992–2012
Science and law have long intersected, but neuroscience is a relatively
new concept to many. 34 In collecting data for the Neuroscience Study, I defined “neuroscience evidence” as incorporating two broad groups of tests: 35
“imaging tests,” which are generated by computer images of a human
brain—such as those tests listed in Chart 4 36—and “non-imaging tests,”
which are based on tests administered by a medical professional to an individual for the purpose of gaining insight into how that person’s brain operates—such as those tests listed in Chart 5.37 The 800 criminal law cases addressing neuroscience evidence from January 1, 1992 to December 31,
2012 38 were collected employing the Westlaw and Lexis legal databases. 39 I
used information from these cases to code and analyze over 100 key factors
34

See MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, supra note 13; OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, supra note 14 (noting that the term “neuroscience” only surfaced in the 1960s).

35
See Ellen G. Koenig, A Fair Trial: When the Constitution Requires Attorneys to Investigate
Their Clients’ Brains, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 177, 194–95 (2013) (dividing neuroscience evidence into “brain scans” and “neuroscience evaluations”). Functional brain scans (EEG, PET,
SPECT, fMRI) “are computer images of a person’s brain that show how his brain works by tracking how blood flows through the brain.” Id. at 195. Structural, or organic brain scans (MRI, CT),
“show what the brain’s structure looks like.” Id. at 197.
36
See infra Chart 4.
37
See infra Chart 5.
38
All statistics and case distributions discussed in this Article are available from the Author
in an extensive statistical appendix. See Neuroscience Study Stat. App. (on file with Author)
[hereinafter “Stat. App.”]; see also DEBORAH W. DENNO, CHANGING LAW’S MIND: HOW NEUROSCIENCE CAN HELP US PUNISH CRIMINALS MORE FAIRLY AND EFFECTIVELY (2016).
39
The case selection techniques employed for the Neuroscience Study were comparable to
those used in my prior studies of behavioral genetics evidence in criminal cases. See Denno, supra
note 23, at 1035–47. For this Article’s Study, searches for decisions were conducted using
Westlaw and Lexis, applying parameters that included the following cases: published opinions,
unpublished opinions, opinions that are slated to be published, and opinions in which the state of
publication is, at the time of this Article’s writing, unclear. In order to make the content of this
Article’s search consistent across all cases, the search looked only at opinions. The search did not
look at the briefs for those opinions because case briefs are not available for all cases in either the
Westlaw or Lexis databases. As mentioned, the search incorporated judicial decisions released
between January 1, 1992, and December 31, 2012. In order to collect the relevant opinions and to
make the search consistent with the Author’s past studies, the search was limited to decisions in
which courts reference permutations of the following terms: “neuro or brain,” “MRI,” “fMRI,”
“PET scan,” “CAT scan,” “CT scan,” “SPECT,” “EEG,” “BEAM,” or “brain fingerprinting.”
Some of the searches also contained the terms “ineffective” or “effective” (where those terms
appeared within three words of the word “assistance”), and also title assignations used by experts,
such as “Dr.” To be included in this Article’s study, a court must have announced a disposition in
a case where a party either introduced or sought to introduce neuroscience evidence at any point in
the proceeding (e.g., innocence-or-guilt phase, penalty phase, post-conviction hearing, evidentiary
hearing, etc.). Cases in which neuroscience evidence was introduced post-trial were included in
the Study only if the court took action on the basis of that evidence. Such action could consist of
granting an evidentiary hearing, finding ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel’s failure to
pursue the evidence, or finding prior court error for failure to admit the evidence. The Author also
required that the court have considered the neuroscience evidence as part of its rationale for a
particular holding.
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relevant to the criminal justice system. 40 Although some cases that discuss
neuroscience evidence do not find their way into the Westlaw and Lexis
databases (for example, because they have never been reported), those that
do can be retrieved by anyone who would like to verify or replicate my
methods. This selection strategy also provides relative consistency and accountability across the twenty years this Study examines.
The Neuroscience Study’s 800 cases are documented in separate Appendixes on file with the Author. 41 The cases fall into three categories: 247
cases (30.88%) concern neuroscience evidence as it pertains to the victim,
primarily to prove the extent of a victim’s brain injury; 42 514 cases
(64.25%) concern neuroscience evidence as it pertains to the defendant; and
thirty-nine cases (4.88%) concern neuroscience evidence as it pertains to
both the defendant and the victim because the brains of one or more individuals in both the “victim” and “defendant” categories were examined. 43
The focus of this Article is on the cases in the latter two categories—
“defendant” and “both victim and defendant”—which comprise 553 cases
or 69.13% of the total data set of 800 cases. This Article refers to these two
categories generically as “Defendant Cases.”
A. Crimes and Punishments
The vast majority of the Neuroscience Study’s Defendant Cases involve defendants convicted of murder.44 As Chart 1 shows, 45 two-thirds of
40
See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38. The Author supervised the
coding of all data. Data were coded with the assistance of three J.D. graduates of Fordham Law
School with a strong interest in law and neuroscience. These coders were Daniel Goddin, J.D.,
Jeremy Gold, J.D., and Ellen Koenig, J.D. These coders worked together and spot-checked each
other at key points in time during the Neuroscience Study, thereby ensuring inter-rater reliability
and consistency. The coding efforts of these three were then checked again for validity and reliability by four additional coders, all current J.D. candidates at Fordham Law School. These coders
were Aaron Neishlos, Madhundra Sivakumar, David Tarras, and Katherine Yi.
41
See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38.
42
These victim cases follow a pattern that is distinct from other types of cases because neuroscience evidence is used to prove the extent of a victim’s injury and it is mostly introduced by the
State. In a typical victim injury case, a prosecutor introduces into court a CAT scan of the brain of
a baby who has been shaken, or of an adult who has suffered a gunshot wound to the head. This
neuroscience evidence, which almost always comes in the form of brain imaging, is used to prove
either the perpetrator’s intent (to abuse, injure, or kill) and thus his guilt, or it is used for the purposes of requesting a harsher sentence based on the severity of the injury inflicted upon the victim.
See State v. McDowell, 715 S.E.2d 602, 604 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (“Dr. Riemer identified fortyfive gunshot wounds to Mr. Howell’s body, including a sufficient number of entrance and exit
wounds in Mr. Howell’s head that his entire brain was destroyed.”); see also Stat. App., supra
note 38; DENNO, supra note 38 (listing and examining all victim cases).
43
See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38.
44
See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38. The 553 defendants were
convicted of the following crimes (only the most serious crime conviction per defendant is listed):
366 murder convictions that resulted in a death sentence; ninety-five murder convictions that did
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the Defendant Cases (366 cases or 66.18%) began as capital cases in which
the defendant was eligible for the death penalty even if that sentence was
later reduced. Defendants in the remaining cases (187 cases or 33.82%)
faced disproportionately severe sentences.46 Among these non-death penalty
cases, less than half (80 cases or 42.78%) were given a sentence of life either with or without the possibility of parole. The other 107 cases were
mostly allotted prison sentences of substantial length. In sum, my analysis
indicates that neuroscience evidence is typically used in cases where defendants face the death penalty, a life sentence, or a substantial prison sentence.
The Neuroscience Study also reveals that neuroscience evidence is
employed at different stages of cases. In a capital case, neuroscience may be
incorporated during the guilt-or-innocence phase and/or the penalty phase. 47
The guilt-or-innocence phase requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant committed an alleged crime; this phase invites
the use of defenses that suggest a defendant was not fully responsible. 48 In
the penalty phase, the jury has found the defendant guilty of the capital
crime and is determining whether to sentence the defendant to death.49 The
great majority of death penalty states require that the jury consider both evidence of aggravation from the State and evidence of mitigation from the
defense. 50 In this Study, the concept of mitigation is not exclusive to death
penalty cases, but that is by far the most common context in which the term
is used. 51 In most jurisdictions, aggravating factors must outweigh mitigating factors for a defendant to be sentenced to death.52
not result in a death sentence; one negligent homicide; five attempted murder or conspiracy to
commit murder; six sexual assaults; thirteen robbery, burglary, theft or home invasion; seventeen
assault or battery; four child abuse; seven fraud or conspiracy to commit fraud; one arson; seventeen drug trafficking or drug possession; one criminal possession of a weapon; one distribution of
child pornography; one filing false public records and perjury; one escape; five driving under the
influence or leaving the scene; one criminal mistreatment; one bribery; two racketeering or making threats; one illegal gambling; and seven unknown charges. Id.
45
See infra Chart 1.
46
Chart 1 shows the most serious sentence for which a defendant was eligible. For example,
if a defendant was sentenced for seventeen years-to-life, Chart 1 categorizes that defendant as
having a life sentence. For some cases, an opinion was adjudicated without the use of a sentence.
In other cases, the defendant had yet to be sentenced at the time of the opinion’s publication. See
id.
47
See Blume & Paavola, supra note 23, at 914 (discussing the two phases of capital cases
generally and the application of neuroimaging as mitigation).
48
See id.
49
Id. at 914–15.
50
Id. (“Unlike the decision the jurors made during the guilt-or-innocence phase of the proceedings . . . this decision is not . . . a determination of fact, for example, did the defendant do it,
but a moral and normative choice—does he deserve to die?” (internal quotations omitted)).
51
See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38. In the Neuroscience Study
there were about a dozen cases that used the term “mitigation” to apply to the goals of certain
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Mitigating factors usually include information about a capital defendant’s background and life prior to his crime, whereas aggravating factors
include the circumstances surrounding a crime and a defendant’s prior criminal record.53 Death penalty jurisdictions vary with respect to the types of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances that they permit fact-finders to
consider; but the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that defendants can
present mitigating evidence relevant to “any aspect of [the] defendant’s
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” 54 This highly
open-ended standard allows for a full range of mitigating factors to be introduced; most attorneys weave these facts into a compelling “story” that
can be critical to determining a defendant’s fate. 55
The Neuroscience Study is the first empirical study to systematically
investigate how courts assess the mitigating and aggravating strength of
neuroscience evidence. My analysis reveals that neuroscience evidence is
usually offered to mitigate punishments in the way that traditional criminal
law has always allowed, especially in the penalty phases of death penalty
trials. This finding is noteworthy because it controverts the popular image
of neuroscience evidence as a double-edged sword—one that will either get
defendants off the hook altogether or unfairly brand them as posing a future
danger to society. To the contrary, the Neuroscience Study indicates that
neuroscience evidence is typically introduced for well-established legal

defenses such as extreme mental or emotional disturbance or insanity. See Stat. App., supra note
38; see also DENNO, supra note 38.
52
James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, Matters of Life or Death: The Sentencing Provisions
in Capital Punishment Statutes, 31 CRIM. L. BULL. 19, 33–52 (1995) (discussing state law sentencing formulas generally). But see Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173, 181 (2006) (upholding a
Kansas death penalty statute that allowed jurors to impose the death penalty when aggravating
circumstances and mitigating circumstances were equally distributed). In all circumstances it
should be noted that if a defendant challenges a death sentence, a reviewing court must reweigh
the aggravating evidence against the totality of available mitigating evidence. See Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003). For an insightful discussion of mitigating and aggravating factors and how they interplay, see O. Carter Snead, Memory and Punishment, 64 VAND. L. REV.
1195, 1248–51 (2011).
53
See Malone v. State, 168 P.3d 185, 223 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007).
54
Marsh, 548 U.S. at 174 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)) (internal quotations omitted). The Marsh Court explained that state courts are allowed significant license to
determine “the manner in which aggravating and mitigating circumstances” should be weighed so
long as those courts had rationally narrowed the class of “death-eligible defendants” and permitted
juries to consider a defendant’s “record, personal characteristics, and the circumstances of his
crime” in rendering a sentence. Id.
55
Blume & Paavola, supra note 23, at 914–15. As one court noted, “mitigation evidence can,
quite literally, make the difference between life and death in a capital case.” Marquez-Burrola v.
State, 157 P.3d 749, 764 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007).
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purposes—to provide fact-finders with more complete, reliable, and precise
information when determining a defendant’s fate. 56
B. A Range of Innovative Tests
Mitigation is by no means the exclusive purpose for which neuroscience evidence is introduced. Indeed, the push for mitigation is commonly
accompanied by a complex range of defense strategies, with a full menu of
legal doctrines explicated by neuroscience evidence. 57 Neuroscience evidence is primarily used for mitigation, however, in both death penalty and
non-death penalty cases. Accordingly, this Section will discuss some of the
kinds of mitigating neuroscience evidence available to attorneys.
As Chart 2 shows, 58 the most prevalent mental and behavioral disorders ascribed to defendants by way of neuroscience evidence include disorders of adult personality and behavior, mental and behavioral disorders due
to psychoactive substance abuse, schizophrenia, schizotypal and delusional
disorder, and organic mental disorders. 59 Diagnoses are most commonly
issued by expert medical professionals, although sources such as self-report
and hospital records may also be employed. 60 Notably, although Chart 2
presents information on the prevalence of confirmed diagnoses, many cases
involved expert testimony regarding the possible existence of these and other mental and behavioral disorders. For example, Chart 3 shows that onehalf of the cases (271 cases or 49.01%) featured testimony by an expert
medical professional explaining that the defendant suffered brain damage, 61
which in this study could have been from any one of a number of sources,
such as childhood beatings, car accidents, or severe alcoholism. 62

56

See Jones et al., supra note 22, at 17624 (noting the seven ways that “neuroscientific evidence might aid law”).
57
See infra notes 70–448 and accompanying text; see also Stat. App., supra note 38; DENNO,
supra note 38.
58
See infra Chart 2.
59
For ease of presentation, the diagnoses in Chart 2 are classified using the International
Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision, Clinical Modification (“ICD-10”), in particular, the
ICD-10 V: Mental Health and Behavioral Disorders. The ICD-10 is recognized and ratified by all
193 countries of the World Health Organization. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., ICD-10 CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL AND BEHAVIOURAL DISORDERS: CLINICAL DESCRIPTIONS AND GUIDELINES
(2010). This Study’s coder reviewed each opinion to determine specific neurological diagnoses
ascribed to each defendant. Only expert testimony was considered for the purposes of the coding
process. The experts at the very least held a doctorate in their respective fields. The diagnosing
experts covered numerous professions ranging from medical doctors to forensic psychologists,
neurosurgeons, and pharmacists. See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38.
60
See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38.
61
For detailed glossaries defining and explaining the purposes of many of these tests, see
JONES ET AL., supra note 8, at 755–67; GARLAND, supra note 15, at 201–09.
62
See Stat. App., supra note 38; DENNO, supra note 38.
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Neuroscience evidence supporting the confirmed diagnoses include a
swath of tests encompassing both imaging and non-imaging techniques.
Charts 4 63 and 5 64 list the most commonly used tests. At least one type of
brain imaging test was discussed in nearly two-thirds of the Defendant Cases (350 cases or 63.29%). 65 Although the diagnoses and tests listed in
Charts 2–5 66 overlap within cases, the array of factors represented in each
of these charts illustrates the criminal justice system’s reliance on and acceptance of neuroscience evidence for mitigation purposes. Moreover, the
results portrayed in these charts make clear that the criminal justice system
comfortably incorporates even very recent technology for assessing defendants’ mental capabilities. For example, Chart 467 indicates that brain imaging tests known as QEEG scans were referenced or used in fifteen cases,
despite being first introduced in a courtroom only five years ago in the 2010
Grady Nelson case. 68
In sum, the Neuroscience Study reveals a modern criminal justice system that is open to employing a wide range of neuroscience evidence. As a
result, attorneys currently prosecuting and defending criminal cases must
educate themselves about medical and neurological conditions and tests that
a past generation of lawyers confronted rarely, if at all. Part II will discuss
one of the most striking findings of the Neuroscience Study, which is that
courts not only expect attorneys to investigate and use available neuroscience evidence in their cases when it is appropriate, but they penalize attorneys who neglect this obligation. 69
II. NEUROSCIENCE AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that an attorney’s performance is
determined by a standard of “prevailing professional norms,” 70 which, for
capital cases, entails a “thorough investigation” 71 of “all reasonably available mitigating evidence” 72 relevant to a defendant’s history and circumstances. 73 The Court has stressed repeatedly that a key part of this mitiga63

See infra Chart 4.
See infra Chart 5.
65
See infra Chart 4; Stat. App., supra note 38; DENNO, supra note 38.
66
See infra Charts 2–5.
67
See infra Chart 4.
68
See Nelson, No. F05-846; Shen, supra note 8, at 352; Judge Okays QEEG Evidence, supra
note 8.
69
See infra notes 70–274 and accompanying text.
70
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
71
Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39 (2009) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
396 (2000)).
72
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (emphasis and internal quotations omitted).
73
Porter, 558 U.S. at 39.
64
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tion inquiry requires attorneys to investigate defendants’ cognitive and intellectual deficiencies because such evidence has a particularly pronounced
impact on mitigation, especially in death penalty cases. 74
According to the Court, an attorney’s failure to conduct such an investigation hinders the attorney’s ability to make reasonable strategic decisions
about how and when to present evidence that may benefit his or her client. 75
Furthermore, those attorneys open themselves up to defendants’ appeals
claiming prejudicially deficient counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, known as an “ineffective assistance of counsel” or Strickland claim. 76
In 1984, in Strickland v. Washington,77 the U.S. Supreme Court established a two-pronged test to assess the validity of ineffective assistance of
counsel challenges. First, counsel’s performance must actually be “deficient,”
and second, this deficient performance must have “prejudiced” the defendant. 78 To be “prejudiced,” the legal counsel must not only be of poor quality,
but must also be the “but for” cause of the resulting conviction. 79 In the Neuroscience Study, defendant-petitioners who satisfied this Strickland test were
typically afforded relief in the form of a new penalty phase, 80 reversal of their

74
These deficiencies cover a broad span. See Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 946 (2010)
(frontal lobe damage); Porter, 558 U.S. at 36 (brain damage and cognitive defects in reading,
writing, and memory); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 392 (2005) (organic brain damage and
significant cognitive impairments); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004) (impaired intellectual functioning); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535 (diminished mental capacities); Williams, 529 U.S.
at 396 (borderline mental retardation). The American Bar Association Guidelines also advise
attorneys to conduct an investigation into a defendant’s neurological history as part of a death
penalty defendant’s mitigation claim. Specifically, the comment to Guideline 4.1 states: “Counsel
must compile extensive historical data, as well as obtain a thorough physical and neurological
examination. Diagnostic studies, neuropsychological testing, appropriate brain scans, blood tests
or genetic studies, and consultation with additional mental health specialists may also be necessary.” ABA, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 956 (2003). Indeed, scholars have suggested that the ABA’s
guidelines provide more protection for defendants than the Strickland test. See Koenig, supra note
35, at 204 (“[U]nder the ABA Guidelines approach, neuroscience evidence should be a real part of
counsel’s reasonable investigation, and, specifically in capital cases, defense counsel may be ineffective for failing to comply with this duty.”).
75
See Sears, 561 U.S. at 954 (“We rejected any suggestion that a decision to focus on one
potentially reasonable trial strategy . . . [can be] ‘justified by a tactical decision’ when ‘counsel did
not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.’”
(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 364)).
76
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–92 (establishing and discussing the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel).
77
Id. at 687.
78
Id.
79
See id.
80
See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38.
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conviction for a new trial, 81 or a remand with instructions to hold a new evidentiary hearing. 82
As commentators have long noted, however, the Strickland standard
“is notoriously difficult for defendants to meet” and the percentage of successful claims is small. 83 Whether a defendant’s lawyer is “asleep, drunk,
unprepared, or unknowledgeable,” courts still shy away from granting such
claims. 84 One scholar pithily stated that any “lawyer with a pulse will be
deemed effective.” 85 Overwhelmingly, courts presume that attorneys are
adequate and, even if defendants can surmount this presumption with a
show of an attorney’s “deficiency,” defendants can still fall short of meeting
the prejudice prong. 86
Yet Strickland claims are particularly significant when neuroscience
evidence is at issue, given the U.S. Supreme Court’s emphasis on the mitigating value of neuroscience evidence in criminal cases. 87 Indeed, the Neuroscience Study reveals a remarkable finding: among the Strickland claims
recorded in the Study’s 553 Defendant Cases, nearly all of the successful
claims were based on an attorney’s failure to appropriately investigate,
gather, or understand neuroscience evidence. 88 The next Section explains
this finding in more detail.
A. The Marked Success of Strickland Claims
Among the Neuroscience Study’s 553 Defendant Cases, most of the
defendants raised multiple Strickland claims. These claims ranged from an
attorney’s mishandling of neuroscience evidence to a broad array of nonneuroscience issues such as an attorney’s errors during the jury selection
process, a conflict of interest with multiple clients, or a failure to communicate with a client. 89 Chart 6 90 breaks down the number and success rate of
81

See, e.g., State v. Hales, 152 P.3d 321, 325 (Utah 2007) (remanding for a new trial).
See, e.g., People v. Jacobazzi, 966 N.E.2d 1, 32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (remanding for a further evidentiary hearing).
83
Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1069, 1074
(2009); see also Nancy J. King, Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122 YALE L.J.
2428, 2431 (2013) (noting that prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan,
132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), “less than 1% of noncapital habeas petitions were granted for any claim”
and that Martinez will be unlikely to alter this outcome).
84
Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1.
85
Marc L. Miller, Wise Masters, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1751, 1786 (1999).
86
See generally Hessick, supra note 83 (discussing Strickland claims generally and observing
historical criticisms of the prejudice prong as overly difficult to satisfy).
87
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
88
See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38.
89
In the Neuroscience Study, it was unusual for a defendant-petitioner to bring only one ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a given case. Some of the individual opinions in the Study’s
data set featured dozens of ineffective assistance of counsel claims with some being centered on
82
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these Strickland claims in three ways: all 553 cases, only death penalty cases (366), and only non-death penalty cases (187). As the chart shows, over
one-half (293 cases or 52.98%) of the 553 defendants raised a Strickland
claim during litigation. 91 Of those 293 cases, over one-quarter (81 cases or
27.65%) included a successful Strickland claim, meaning that the defendants successfully proved that they met the two prongs of the Strickland test.
A clear majority of the cases (254 or 86.69%) featured at least one Strickland claim based specifically on an issue related to neuroscience evidence.
In turn, 75 of those 254 cases (or 29.53%) included a Strickland claim that
was granted, and all but one of those 75 cases were specifically based on
the attorney’s mishandling or omission of neuroscience evidence (74 cases
or 98.67%). 92 In sum, nearly all successful Strickland claims were based on
an attorney’s failure to appropriately investigate, gather, or understand neuroscience evidence—as opposed to any one of a number of other types of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims that the Neuroscience Study recorded. 93
The next Section will provide more detail regarding the bases for these
seventy-four claims. 94 Courts typically found multiple and often interrelated
reasons for granting the claims, so the categories discussed in the next Section are not mutually exclusive. They are, however, enlightening for understanding attorney strategy. 95
B. How Counsel Damage Their Cases
Results from the Neuroscience Study show that Strickland claims are
most frequently raised in death penalty cases, presumably because the
stakes are so high for the defendant. 96 Yet as Chart 6 indicates, 97 when it
comes to neuroscience-related Strickland claims, there is little distinction in
neuroscience evidence (failure to procure a brain imaging scan, failure to plead a diminished capacity defense, etc.) and some focused on non-neuroscience evidence (such as the improper handling of the jury selection process, failure to object to improper jury instructions, etc.).
90
See infra Chart 6.
91
See infra Chart 6.
92
See infra Chart 6.
93
See infra Chart 6; Stat. App., supra note 38; DENNO, supra note 38.
94
See infra notes 96–119 and accompanying text.
95
The Neuroscience Study statistics presented refer only to a court opinion’s reference to a
stated theme or trend, and not the court relying solely on that stated theme or trend.
96
See infra Chart 6. As Chart 6 shows, in the Neuroscience Study over two-thirds (255 cases
or 69.67%) of the 366 capital murder defendants raised a Strickland claim during litigation. In
sharp contrast, only one-fifth (38 cases or 20.32%) of the 187 non-capital murder defendants
raised a Strickland claim. Of the 255 capital murder cases that raised a Strickland claim, over onequarter (72 cases or 28.24%) included a Strickland claim that was granted relative to a somewhat
smaller percentage of the thirty-eight non-capital murder cases (9 cases or 23.68%). Id.
97
See infra Chart 6.
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proportional frequency between death penalty and non-death penalty cases. 98 The overwhelming impact of neuroscience evidence in the grant of a
Strickland claim is virtually the same for both types of cases. 99 Among the
seventy-four cases that successfully raised neuroscience-related Strickland
claims, each of the sixty-six death penalty cases resulted in the petitioner’s
death sentence being vacated. 100 In each of the eight non-death penalty cases, habeas relief (reversal of judgment) was granted. 101
In half of the seventy-four cases, the court determined that defense
counsel “actively” rather than “passively” damaged their clients’ cases. 102 I
use the term “actively” to designate an attorney’s deliberate decision to engage in or refrain from a certain action that prejudiced a client. Conversely I
use the term “passively” to designate an attorney’s objectively unreasonable
failure to take a certain course of action that prejudiced a client. The most
common examples of active damage by attorneys included the following
scenarios: eliciting damaging testimony from defense witnesses; 103 offering
evidence/testimony for the purpose of mitigation that actually served as aggravating evidence; 104 choosing not to ask for a continuance to investigate
mitigation evidence; 105 erroneously presenting the wrong defense or withdrawing a favorable defense based on the evidence in their possession; 106
98

Altogether, 221 of the 255 cases in the death penalty group (86.67%) featured at least one
Strickland claim that was based specifically on the quality of counsel’s handling of neuroscience
evidence; similarly thirty-three of the thirty-eight cases in the non-death penalty group (86.84%)
featured one such neuroscience Strickland claim. While these percentages are similar, grants of
Strickland claims vary. For the death penalty group, sixty-seven of the 221 cases included a
Strickland claim that was granted (30.32%); yet, for the non-death penalty group, eight of the
thirty-three cases (24.24%) included a Strickland claim that was granted. That said, the proportion
of those successful claims based specifically on the mishandling of neuroscience evidence is virtually identical for both groups. For death penalty defendants, sixty-six of the sixty-seven successful claims (or 98.51%) were based specifically on a mishandling of neuroscience evidence whereas, for non-death penalty defendants, all eight of the eight successful claims were based specifically on a mishandling of neuroscience evidence. See id.
99
See id.
100
Stat. App., supra note 38; DENNO, supra note 38.
101
See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38. In some cases, the reversal
of judgment took one of the following forms: affirmed a lower court’s grant of habeas relief and
remand, vacated the death sentence to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the merits of the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim; granted a Certificate of Appealability for the same purpose; or remanded the lower court’s denial of habeas relief and remand. See Stat. App., supra note
38; see also DENNO, supra note 38.
102
See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38.
103
See Waters v. Zant, 979 F.2d 1473, 1482–94 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated, 11 F.3d 139 (11th
Cir. 1993).
104
See Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475, 507–08 (Fla. 2012).
105
See Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1156–61 (9th Cir. 2000); see also State v. Coney,
845 So. 2d 120, 131–32 (Fla. 2003).
106
See Laird v. Horn, 159 F. Supp. 2d 58, 112–13 (E.D. Pa. 2001); State v. Johnson, 794
A.2d 654, 665–68 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
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advising the client to waive a mitigation presentation; 107 choosing not to
present mitigation at the penalty phase that counsel erroneously believed
would damage the “humanizing” evidence; or making damaging statements
of their own. 108
Most (sixty-nine cases or 93.24%) of the seventy-four cases involving
a successful neuroscience-related Strickland claim were based on trial
counsel’s failure to adequately present a case in mitigation (“FTPM”). 109
This is a very broad category involving several overlapping sub-categories
of deficient performance. 110 Nearly one third of the sixty-nine cases contained both an FTPM claim and an additional similar yet separate Strickland
claim. 111 These additional claims included the following deficiencies: counsel’s failure to adequately investigate and present a mental health defense;
counsel’s failure to consult a necessary mental health expert; and, in two
cases, counsel’s failure to adequately understand or be familiar with the
American Bar Association guidelines for attorney representation in capital
murder cases. 112
107
See Lynch v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 897 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1290–91, 1306–09 (M.D. Fla.
2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, No. 12-15188, 2015 WL 108623 (11th Cir. Jan. 8, 2015).
108
See Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 856 (2002).
109
Stat. App., supra note 38; DENNO, supra note 38. The legal standard for failure to adequately present a case in mitigation derives from Strickland: “[t]he right to present, and to have
the sentencer consider, any and all mitigating evidence means little if defense counsel fails to look
for mitigating evidence or fails to present a case in mitigation at the capital sentencing hearing.
Accordingly, counsel’s general duty to investigate takes on supreme importance . . . . ” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 706 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
110
Deficient performance in this category often included a failure to sufficiently investigate/present evidence and/or testimony of the following: psychological impairment, neurologic
(functional and organic) impairment, social history containing mental dysfunction cues (including
potentially favorable family and friend testimony), mental health history (including prior medical
records, evaluations, and history of drug and/or alcohol abuse), and several other related pieces of
neuroscience evidence. Stat. App., supra note 38; DENNO, supra note 38.
111
See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38.
112
See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38. Examples of these mental
health defenses include a diminished capacity defense, insanity defense, or a defense based on
defendant’s mental retardation or incompetency to stand trial. Notably, among the six successful
Strickland cases in which an FTPM claim was not offered and/or accepted, the Strickland claims
primarily involved counsel’s failure to adequately investigate and present a mental health defense.
One case involved counsel’s failure to investigate diminished capacity, a failure to contest the
issue of competency, and ineffective counseling regarding the client’s previous plea agreement.
Hoffman v. Arave, 455 F.3d 926, 932–42 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated in part, 552 U.S. 117 (2008).
Two cases involved counsel’s failure to provide adequate assistance during the client’s competency determination. Hummel v. Rosemeyer, 564 F.3d 290, 301–02 (3d Cir. 2009); Deere v. Cullen,
713 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1028–41 (C.D. Cal. 2010). In one case, counsel was found constitutionally
deficient for unreasonably withdrawing an insanity defense without conducting sufficient investigation, and failing to present an intoxication defense based on available, favorable evidence. Johnson, 794 A.2d at 667–68. One case involved counsel severely prejudicing a client by failing to
request a diminished capacity defense. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 2002).
Lastly, one case involved counsel’s failure to call a readily available and willing medical expert
(forensic psychiatrist) whose testimony would be the centerpiece of a diminished capacity defense
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In an overlapping subset of FTMP cases, including one non-death penalty case, 113 a number of courts addressed the failure of counsel to explain
the role of mitigating circumstances and evidence to clients before those
clients waived the right to present a case in mitigation. 114 One of these cases
involved an attorney advising a client to waive the right to a jury trial before
sufficiently articulating the role of mitigating circumstances in a jury’s determination of capital punishment. 115 Another similar case concerned counsel’s failure to fully clarify the definition and role of “mitigating circumstances” to the jury, resulting in prejudice to the client. 116
In more than half of the FTPM cases, courts expressly noted that counsel were actually aware of the mitigating neuroscience evidence, but failed
to adequately investigate that evidence. 117 In the remaining cases, counsel
were either not aware that the mitigating neuroscience evidence existed, or
were aware of the evidence but did not recognize that it was mitigating. 118
Predictably, most defense counsel offered the court excuses for their
deficient and prejudicial performance.119 The next Section will discuss the
excuses that were provided in the seventy-four cases involving a successful
neuroscience-related Strickland claim. 120 Counsel often offered multiple
excuses within the same case, so the categories presented in the next Section are not mutually exclusive. They are nonetheless useful for providing a
general sense of courts’ priorities when assessing Strickland claims.
C. Why Counsel Omit or Mishandle Neuroscience
In nearly one third of the seventy-four cases involving successful neuroscience-related Strickland claims, counsel claimed to have had a reasonable trial strategy or tactic.121 Typically, counsel’s sole defense was that they
were following a course of conduct during trial that they thought would
succeed, and when it did not succeed, they were unprepared for the sentencing phase. 122 For example, in Miller v. Dretke, 123 counsel claimed he “did
not prepare much for the punishment phase” because he believed his client
based on mental dysfunction and mental impairment at the time of crime. State v. Johnson, 968
S.W.2d 686, 695–96 (Mo. 1998).
113
See King v. Kemna, 226 F.3d 981, 985–86 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated on reh'g en banc, 266
F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 2001).
114
Stat. App., supra note 38; DENNO, supra note 38.
115
Lynch, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.
116
Waters, 979 F.2d at 1493.
117
See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38.
118
See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38.
119
See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38.
120
See infra notes 121–150 and accompanying text.
121
See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38.
122
See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38.
123
420 F.3d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 2005).
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would accept the plea bargain of probation. 124 Yet counsel admitted that he
could have acquired her doctors’ letters before the trial’s punishment phase
began, as well as interviewed the doctors before the trial and offered their
testimony as mitigation evidence. 125 Likewise, in Pirtle v. Morgan, 126 trial
counsel’s inexplicable decision to choose an intoxication instruction over a
diminished capacity instruction to explain his client’s lack of premeditation
left the jury “without any guidance as to the significance of the defense testimony.” 127 The court in Smith v. Mullin 128 aptly depicted trial counsel’s
flaws in just one sentence: “Astoundingly, [trial counsel] admitted at the
evidentiary hearing that he was unaware Mr. Smith’s ‘mental state or mental
illness could be introduced as mitigation in the second stage’ of trial.” 129
The court proceeded to find that Mr. Smith’s attorney therefore “made no
attempt to explain how this kind and considerate person could commit such
a horrendous crime, although mental health evidence providing such an explanation was at his fingertips.” 130
In another category of excuses, counsel acknowledged ignorance in the
mishandling of evidence or in communications with experts or clients. 131
These circumstances included counsel inappropriately accepting a client’s
own portrayal of his mental status, relying on unqualified or insufficient
numbers of experts to make decisions regarding a client’s defense, or erroneously believing that a client waived his right to present mitigating evidence because counsel did not did not adequately investigate the client’s
background or mental health issues. 132
Some cases involved attorneys who admitted their incompetence more
straightforwardly. In Loyd v. Whitley, 133 for example, trial counsel conceded
that his inability to adequately investigate and present mitigation evidence
“was based upon a failure to understand the difference between the
McNaughten test for sanity and the Louisiana mitigating factors of ‘mental
or emotional disturbance,’ or ‘mental disease or defect.’” 134 In other cases,
124

Id.
Id.
313 F.3d at 1160.
127
Id. at 1171–72 (internal quotations omitted).
128
379 F.3d 919, 939 (10th Cir. 2004).
129
Id.
130
Id. at 939–40.
131
See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38.
132
See Stat. App., supra note 38; DENNO, supra note 38; see also, e.g., Hurst v. State, 18 So.
3d 975, 1012–13 (Fla. 2009) (involving an attorney who failed to have his client examined by a
mental health expert because counsel believed any mental health mitigation would undermine an
innocence-based strategy); State v. Pearce, 994 So. 2d 1094, 1102–03 (Fla. 2008) (supporting
“trial court’s finding that counsel did not spend sufficient time to prepare for mitigation prior to
Pearce’s waiver . . . [and therefore] was unable to advise Pearce as to potential mitigation”).
133
977 F.2d 149, 149 (5th Cir. 1992).
134
Id. at 152 (citations omitted).
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counsel stated that the client either stopped cooperating with counsel’s investigation of potential mitigation evidence or counsel simply accepted a
client’s waiver of mental health mitigation—explanations that courts found
unacceptable. 135 In Perkins v. Hall, 136 for example, the court acknowledged
evidence of the defendant’s “steadfast” resistance to being evaluated and “labeled [as] crazy” by experts, but concluded nonetheless that counsel was deficient for insufficiently acquiring mitigation evidence from non-experts. 137
Such an alternative would involve more thoroughly investigating the defendant’s background, information from family and friends, records of the
defendant’s potential brain injury, and other methods of circumventing the
defendant’s lack of cooperation. 138
A particularly troubling category of excuses involved the contention
that counsel chose not to present certain mitigation evidence in an attempt
to “humanize,” or conversely, “de-humanize” their clients because they
thought such evidence could do their clients more harm than good. 139 Three
cases are especially representative. In Hurst v. State, 140 the court rejected
defense counsel’s erroneous contention that “any mitigation other than the
fact that [the defendant] was a good person would have been inconsistent”
with the defendant’s guilt-phase claim that he was innocent. 141 As the court
explained, counsel had “no sound basis” for failing “to investigate and present mitigation evidence of [defendant’s] borderline intelligence . . . possible organic brain damage . . . and other mental mitigation.” 142 Such evidence was in no way harmful to defendant’s mitigation claim, nor did it carry the potential to “open[] the door to any damaging testimony.” 143
Likewise, in Turpin v. Lipham, 144 the court upheld a Strickland claim
due to trial counsel’s failure to hire a medical expert for penalty-phase mitigation based on the erroneous and medically unsubstantiated belief that
their client’s mental health records indicated both aggravating and mitigating factors. 145 The attorneys were particularly concerned that they would
135

See Perkins v. Hall 708 S.E.2d 335, 341–42 (Ga. 2011).
Id. at 335.
Id. at 341–42.
138
Id.
139
See Simmons, 105 So. 3d at 507–10; Hurst, 18 So. 3d at 1012–13; Turpin v. Lipham, 510
S.E.2d 32, 40 (Ga. 1998).
140
18 So. 3d at 975.
141
Id. at 1012–13.
142
Id. at 1012.
143
Id. at 1012–13 (“[B]ecause counsel never had Hurst examined and could not know what a
mental health expert might discover, he could not make an informed tactical decision that the
mental mitigation would be inconsistent with the defense or with other mitigation.”).
144
510 S.E.2d at 32.
145
Id. at 40 (noting that the caseworker who determined that defendant’s records could be
viewed as both aggravating and mitigating was merely an unlicensed family counselor and “[n]o
other person with mental health training” evaluated the records).
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dehumanize their client and unleash potentially aggravating evidence if they
enabled experts to interpret their client’s records for the jury. 146 As the court
explained, however, “[t]he jury, left unguided to comb through voluminous
records, was just as likely to encounter aggravating information as mitigating information,” such as a nurse’s note that the defendant attacked another
patient as compared to a caseworker’s memorandum explaining “the terrible
neglect” that the client suffered at the hands of his parents. 147
Finally, in Simmons v. State, 148 the court rejected the attorneys’ “humanizing” justification for somewhat different reasons. In this case, although counsel claimed to be tactically humanizing the defendant, the jury
heard very little positive mitigation because of counsel’s failure to investigate, uncover, and present it. 149 Moreover, counsel provided no rationale to
explain why aggravating evidence would have outweighed such mitigating
evidence during the penalty phase 150
In essence, then, the courts in Hurst, Turpin, and Simmons rejected the
argument that counsel’s failure to investigate or present mitigating information constituted a “strategic decision.” The double-edged-sword argument is unpersuasive when counsel contends that neuroscience evidence
can do more harm than good to clients. Courts plainly expect defense counsel to use neuroscience evidence when appropriate, yet the precise parameters of this expectation can be elusive.
As indicated by the degree of overlap among the categories discussed
in previous sections, Strickland cases involving neuroscience evidence are
often highly complex, and they incorporate a wide range of circumstances.
In Strickland claims, it is not always clear what type of neuroscience evidence will be used, how the courts will handle that evidence, and finally,
when and why the attorneys in these cases will be deemed ineffective. In an
effort to address such questions, the next Section examines in more detail a
selection of the Neuroscience Study’s seventy-four cases involving a successful neuroscience-related Strickland claim.
D. What Courts Expect from Attorneys Using Neuroscience
This Section presents six case studies of opinions that represent the
kinds of attorney failures that prompt courts to grant a neuroscience-related
Strickland claim. 151 As the case studies show, the decisions made by trial
attorneys are egregious in terms of their omission and/or mishandling of
146

Id. at 42.
Id.
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105 So. 3d at 507–10.
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evidence and expert testimony, often with potentially “disastrous” 152 or
“devastating” 153 results for their clients. Courts typically appear influenced
not by just one mistake an attorney may have made but by many such mistakes which, when combined, throw doubt on counsel’s explanations that
their decisions were “strategic.” As one court stresses, bad decisions are not
strategy but rather inadequacy, 154 and therefore just one edge of a sword.
1. Investigate and Present Mitigating Evidence
In the 2012 case of Simmons v. State, 155 following the circuit court’s denial of Simmons’s motion for post-conviction relief on Strickland grounds,
the Supreme Court of Florida ultimately reversed and remanded the denial of
relief as to the penalty phase. According to the court, Simmons’s counsel
“failed to fully investigate and present mitigating evidence regarding Simmons’s childhood and mental health.”156 Simmons’s trial counsel testified
during an evidentiary hearing that, because she thought Simmons was competent, she never consulted a mental health expert on his behalf, nor did she investigate any other kind of mental mitigation.157 Thus, counsel presented no
medical experts whatsoever to the jury during the penalty phase. 158
In sharp contrast, post-conviction defense counsel presented a range of
medical testimony for the purposes of mitigation, including experts who
tested Simmons during a post-conviction evidentiary hearing. 159 Dr. H.D.,
for example, a psychologist and expert in neuropsychology, conducted several non-imaging tests on Simmons including the WAIS-III and the Denman
Neuropsychology Memory Scale to determine if Simmons had brain damage. 160 The results showed that Simmons fell in the borderline range of
mental retardation. 161 Other investigations revealed that Simmons had been
placed in early programs for the severely emotionally disturbed—a status
that ultimately fostered Simmons’s conflicts with other school children and
led in part to Simmons eventually dropping out of school. 162 Consequently,
as an adult, Simmons experienced limited employability and maladjustments in his workplace. 163 After discovering that Simmons was accidentally
152

Hooper v. Mullin, 314 F.3d 1162, 1169 (10th Cir. 2002).
Waters, 979 F.2d at 1494.
154
Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 2006).
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suffocated as an infant and only later revived at a hospital, Dr. H.D. recommended a PET scan to further assess whether Simmons suffered brain damage. 164 The results validated Dr. H.D.’s view of Simmons’s cognitive impairments, which, along with all of his earlier problems in school, fostered
Simmons’s striking impulsivity and misbehavior—“a ‘sort of pervasive
maladjustment.’” 165
According to Dr. H.D., Simmons also suffered from a personality disorder “that manifested in fear of rejection and abandonment, running away
from home, affective instability, depression, extreme self-criticism, and social isolation.” 166 Given Dr. H.D.’s assessment that alcohol and drugs more
strongly affect brain damaged individuals, and that Simmons had continuously consumed both alcohol and marijuana since a young age, Dr. H.D.
rendered Simmons eligible for the statutory mitigator of “extreme mental or
emotional disturbance.” 167 Likewise, while Simmons “could appreciate the
criminality of his conduct,” he “had an impaired capacity to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law,” a classification that was also a statutory mitigator.168
A second expert, Dr. F.W., a psychologist with training in neuropsychology, provided testimony specific to Simmons’s PET scan results. 169 According to Dr. F.W., Simmons’s PET scan abnormalities were so pronounced it
was clear that “Simmons has real trouble understanding people and social
contexts around him.” 170 In addition, Simmons’s “underactive thalamus”
could lead to a loss of control “because that portion of the brain is also involved in stopping hazardous or inappropriate behavior.” 171 Therefore, Dr.
F.W. confirmed that Simmons’s PET scan results met the same criteria necessary for the two statutory mitigators supported by Dr. H.D.’s testimony. 172
Yet post-conviction defense counsel also presented the testimony of a third
expert—a psychotherapist and mitigation specialist—who concluded from
her “psychosocial evaluation of Simmons” that “Simmons never developed
the skills to live in the adult world.” 173
The court ultimately found in Simmons’s favor on the Strickland claim
despite the State’s own medical expert rebutting defense counsel’s PET scan
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evidence. 174 The court recognized the “weighty aggravators” in Simmons’s
case, but it also stressed the need to reverse for a new penalty phase in light
of trial counsel’s extraordinary failure to investigate or present available
mitigating evidence.175 In the court’s view, trial counsel had no reasonable
“strategic decision;” the contrast in quality of representation between trial
and post-conviction was just too great. 176 In particular, Simmons’s “severe
mental disturbance” was such a “weighty” mitigating factor that trial counsel’s failure to present it in the penalty phase could have been prejudicial.177
The court vacated Simmons’s death sentence. 178
2. Review Prior History and Testimony
In Frierson v. Woodford, 179 Frierson appealed for federal habeas corpus
relief, alleging in his Strickland claim that his penalty phase counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present available mitigation evidence of
several disorders: childhood head trauma, chronic drug abuse, mental impairments, and organic brain damage. 180 The court agreed that counsel’s conduct was deficient and prejudicial, emphasizing counsel’s failure to review
evidence and testimony that was presented in earlier stages of the case. 181
Specifically, the court found that counsel never examined trial transcripts
containing a drug history report prepared by Dr. R.S., a psychologist and
pharmacologist. 182 In his trial testimony, Dr. R.S. mentioned his report six
times, 183 stating that Frierson “was severely intoxicated with PCP” during
174
Id. at 503, 506. According to the State’s expert, the PET scan of Simmons’s brain did not
“appear to be abnormal.” Id. at 506. Moreover, the same expert testified that “a PET scan cannot
be used with any degree of reliability to diagnose behavioral problems;” however, on crossexamination the expert “agreed that he ha[d] not examined Simmons and ha[d] not read any reports of Simmons’ functional ability, and therefore d[id] not know how Simmons’ brain [wa]s
functioning.” Id.
175
Id. at 507.
176
Id. at 510; see also White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220–21 (11th Cir. 1992). As the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit explained:

The [Strickland] test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have done.
Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether
some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial. . . . . We are not interested in grading lawyers' performances; we are interested in whether the adversarial process at trial, in fact, worked
adequately.
Id.
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the commission of his crime, and that he likely suffered mental impairment
from his chronic drug abuse. 184
Frierson’s attorney was also unaware of a report prepared by Dr. M.G.,
a forensic psychiatrist, who read his report into the record five times during
trial testimony. 185 In Dr. M.G.’s opinion, Frierson’s “PCP intoxication during the crime prevented Frierson from deliberating, premeditating, and
meaningfully reflecting on his actions,” as is required for a first-degree
murder conviction. 186 Had Frierson’s counsel reviewed the trial transcripts,
he would have learned that Frierson underwent several psychiatric evaluations while in custody of the California Youth Authority, including one explaining that Frierson exhibited symptoms of brain dysfunction.187 The
court found that because counsel did not avail himself of this information
and, in turn, give it to Dr. M.G., counsel had “‘failed to provide [his expert]
with the information necessary to make an accurate evaluation of [Frierson’s] neurological system.’” 188
Counsel contended that he purposely omitted evidence of Frierson’s
past psychiatric evaluations in order to present Frierson in a positive light at
the penalty hearing, and to avoid evidence of his antisocial personality disorder. 189 As counsel explained, “such evidence would only have helped the
prosecution’s case by showing Mr. Frierson to be unredeemable and without
remorse, and would thus have undermined my efforts to humanize
[him].” 190 The court strongly rejected this excuse, holding that counsel’s
decision clearly reflected not strategy, but rather inadequacy, and was therefore deficient.191
3. Properly Handle Evidence and Experts
In Hooper v. Mullin, 192 Hooper sought federal habeas relief after he
was convicted of three murders in state court and sentenced to death.193
Hooper raised a Strickland claim at the sentencing phase, alleging that his
184
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attorneys mishandled mitigating psychological evidence.194 On habeas review, the court agreed with Hooper, granting him relief from his death sentence. 195
Before Hooper committed his crimes, he received counseling from Dr.
R.A., who administered several non-imaging neuropsychological tests to
ascertain Hooper’s intellectual functioning. 196 Dr. R.A. reported that Hooper’s cognitive functioning and intelligence were average, but that he may be
learning disabled because of his challenges with spelling. 197 The test results
also demonstrated that Hooper had psychological problems, including his
“difficulty controlling his anger and coping with everyday problems.” 198
After Hooper committed his crimes but prior to his conviction, his attorneys hired a psychologist, Dr. P.M., who reviewed Dr. R.A.’s report on
Hooper. 199 Without conducting his own evaluation of Hooper, Dr. P.M. then
submitted a report indicating that “there was evidence of ‘mild but probable
brain damage’ that could increase the likelihood of violence, especially if
[Hooper] was under the influence of alcohol or other substances.”200 Dr.
P.M. also reported that Hooper might be suffering from a “serious psychiatric thought disorder.” 201 After Hooper’s conviction, Dr. P.M. refused, for
ethical reasons, the attorneys’ request that he testify at the sentencing proceedings, explaining that he had never personally examined Hooper. 202 Dr.
P.M. also warned that his comments about Hooper “likely would be aggravating rather than mitigating.” 203
Regardless, Hooper’s attorneys subpoenaed Dr. P.M. to authenticate
his report so that both Dr. P.M.’s and Dr. R.A.’s reports could be admitted
into evidence at the capital sentencing phase.204 Predictably, however, Dr.
P.M. informed the jury that “he did not put ‘enormous stock’ in his conclusions because he did not personally evaluate [Hooper].” 205 Dr. P.M. also
stated that Dr. R.A. was the better expert to address Hooper’s alleged brain
damage because Dr. R.A. had evaluated Hooper in person. 206 The State
194
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called Dr. R.A. in rebuttal, and Dr. R.A. testified that Hooper “had a mild
learning disability, but no brain damage.” 207 In addition, while Hooper had
some psychological problems, “those problems would not cause him to lose
touch with reality or make him incapable of controlling himself or his anger.” 208
Such contradictions in the testimony of both experts moved the court
to grant Hooper’s Strickland claim. 209 Neither expert had provided “any
mitigating evidence” for Hooper “and their combined testimony was disastrous for [his] defense.” 210 As the court explained, “[t]he jury was left with
unchallenged expert opinions that [Hooper] did not suffer from brain damage, had no particular trouble controlling his temper, and that his learning
disability would not have affected his capacity for violence or ability to reason in adverse circumstances.” 211
The court’s analysis of Strickland’s deficiency prong 212 focused on
whether the attorneys’ presentation of the evidence was part of a “reasonable trial strategy” or “the product of ‘neglectful’ or otherwise erroneous representation.” 213 While their penalty phase strategy was to present evidence
indicating that Hooper may have had brain damage that could lead to violence, in reality, defense counsel followed a course devoid of investigation. 214
Hooper’s attorneys claimed that they intentionally chose not to have
Dr. P.M. further evaluate Hooper out of concern that the results would do
more harm than good; in other words, a more thorough assessment could
show that Hooper had no brain damage. 215 Instead, by using Dr. P.M.’s report that Hooper “might have brain damage,” they could still press for mitigation on Hooper’s behalf, despite acknowledging that additional psychological testing could have provided more definitive mitigating prognoses. 216
The court was unconvinced; even if counsel considered their rationale to be
a “strategic decision,” they still presented the evidence they had “in an un-
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prepared and ill-informed manner.” 217 The court thus affirmed Hooper’s
petition for habeas relief from his death sentence.218
4. Distinguish Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
In Waters v. Zant, 219 Waters had been convicted of capital murder in
state court and sentenced to death.220 He appealed a district court’s denial of
his habeas corpus petition, which was grounded in part on a Strickland
claim. 221 The appellate court affirmed Waters’s conviction, but granted him
a writ of habeas corpus as to the death penalty because of his attorney’s ineffective assistance at the sentencing phase of trial.222
As the court explained, Waters’s attorney never informed the jury “of
the role of aggravating and mitigating circumstances” even though Waters
suffered from a mental illness that was a clear mitigating circumstance.223
Not only did the attorney fail to acquire mitigating evidence from medical
experts concerning Waters’s mental abnormalities,224 he inexplicably omitted the mental illness testimony that he had introduced in an earlier effort to
prove the insanity defense at trial. 225 Waters had twice attempted suicide
and had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, an illness typically
accompanied by delusions and hallucinations. 226 He had also been treated
with an antipsychotic drug prescribed to diffuse his “feelings of anger and
hostility,” but he had stopped taking the drug a few weeks prior to his
crimes. 227
Furthermore, testimony at Waters’s state habeas proceeding revealed
that Waters’s medical experts “had no idea” that counsel expected them to
offer mitigating evidence at the guilt-innocence phase. 228 The court noted,
for example, that counsel failed to elicit one expert psychologist’s opinion
that Waters’s mental illness would have influenced his behavior on the day
he committed his crimes, or that he also could have been hallucinating that
day in light of his mental condition.229 Such evidence may have at least “of217
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fered the jury an alternative” to what the court found to be counsel’s most
deficient performance: eliciting damaging testimony from his own defense
witnesses, while failing to draw upon their readily available favorable testimony. 230
As the court stated, counsel “presented evidence that was not only very
harmful but was devastating to his client’s plea for life.” 231 Furthermore,
counsel introduced experts “who never should have been a part of the defense case,” including psychiatrist Dr. H.D., whose “entire testimony was
harmful to Waters.” 232 Dr. H.D. testified that Waters only suffered from
“anxiety neurosis, not paranoid schizophrenia,” and additionally that Waters
was “in good contact with reality.” 233 As the court explained, counsel’s handling of Dr. H.D.’s harmful testimony was particularly detrimental to Waters because it was elicited by counsel himself on direct examination, not by
the prosecution during cross-examination.234 In addition, counsel was so
unprepared that he had “no idea” what Dr. H.D. would say on the stand. 235
Counsel’s elicited testimony from another expert witness was equally
troublesome, suggesting first that Waters’s mental illness had no bearing on
his commission of the crime, 236 and then, “[w]ith a persistence that resembled that of a prosecutor” drawing forth testimony that “Waters attacked his
victims to fulfill his sexual desire.” 237 Most stunningly, the expert witness
attempted to prevent counsel from extracting such detrimental information,
but without success. 238 According to the expert’s post-conviction affidavit
about his experience, counsel had never informed him that he would be testifying for Waters at the penalty phase.239 Had the expert known this, his
testimony would have been favorable. 240 He explained that Waters suffered
from a “schizophrenic disorder” that provided substantial grounds for mitigation. 241
According to the court, counsel “totally failed” to effectively handle
the paltry mitigating evidence he did decide to present. 242 He also neglected
to explain to the jury why Waters’s mental illness could be a mitigating fac-
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tor. 243 The court emphasized ample precedent indicating that counsel’s performance was without question constitutionally deficient.244
5. Research Early Childhood Disorders
In Stankewitz v. Wong, 245 the court ultimately vacated Stankewitz’s
death sentence and ordered a re-sentence of life without the possibility of
parole. 246 According to Stankewitz’s Strickland claim, his penalty phase
attorney not only performed deficiently but also prejudiced Stankewitz with
a skeletal investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence that failed to
address aggravating factors. 247
In particular, Stankewitz claimed that counsel failed to sufficiently investigate and present evidence of his “impaired intellectual functioning and
brain damage,” 248 which was thoroughly documented by three medical experts who agreed that he suffered from brain injuries as well as a history of
mental illness. 249 According to one of the experts, Stankewitz was borderline mentally retarded and evinced “significant brain dysfunction, perhaps
attributable to Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and childhood abuse.”250 Another
expert testified that Stankewitz’s brain damage “would produce problems
with emotional control, tendencies to be impulsive and unpredictable, and
to be unable to exercise adequate judgment or to understand the consequences of his behavior.” 251 Moreover, Stankewitz had been diagnosed with
antisocial personality disorder and evidenced neurologic abnormalities
based on the results of two EEG tests.252 Some of the strongest testimony
came from the doctor who administered the first EEG test and a psychiatric
evaluation when Stankewitz was age twelve. 253 At that early age Stankewitz
already exhibited “sudden loss of control;” in addition he “becomes abusive, uses vile language, [is] combative, [and demonstrates] ample evidence
of neurotic disturbance (bitten fingernails and bed-wetting).” 254 Given that
all of this mitigation evidence was available at the penalty phase and much
243
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of it was officially documented, counsel’s choice to exclude it was “unreasonable” and prejudicial. 255
6. Evaluate Mental Health and Drug Abuse
In James v. Ryan, 256 petitioner James, convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death, appealed a district court’s denial of his habeas corpus
petition. 257 The court affirmed his petition for habeas relief from his death
sentence, 258 citing counsel’s “complete failure to investigate and present
mitigating evidence of James’s troubled childhood, his mental illness, and
his history of chronic drug abuse.” 259 The court held that this deficiency
prejudiced James because his troubled history was relevant to the sentencing judge’s assessment of James’s moral culpability. 260
In particular, the court found that counsel did not conduct even the
most elementary research on James’s background. 261 The court noted that a
minimal investigation would have uncovered “obvious indications that
James had suffered emotional and psychological trauma during his childhood,” 262 including a pretrial competency report that labeled James’s early
years as “disturbed.” 263 This label was reinforced by evidence that James’s
father was a drug addict who was incarcerated during James’s youth, as
well as documentation that James’s mother offered him into foster care before he reached the age of three. 264 Counsel also failed to gather accessible
documentation of James’s educational history, which would have revealed
his “subaverage academic and intellectual functioning, as well as his behavioral and social problems.” 265
Furthermore, counsel did not sufficiently study James’s mental health,
which should be a key focus in any investigation of a defendant’s background for mitigation purposes. 266 The competency reports of two doctors
noted that James had a history of suicide attempts, some of which included
crashing cars at high speeds. 267 Counsel knew that James took lithium and
255
Id. at 1112 (“[T]here was a reasonable probability that the jury would not have sentenced
Stankewitz to death had it been presented with the evidence of the numerous deprivations and
abuses Stankewitz alleges that he suffered.” (citation and internal quotations omitted)).
256
679 F.3d 780, 784–85 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1579 (2013).
257
Id. at 785.
258
Id. at 820.
259
Id. at 786.
260
Id.
261
Id. at 786, 807.
262
Id. at 808.
263
Id.
264
Id.
265
Id.
266
Id.
267
Id.
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had undergone psychiatric care,268 and was therefore aware of the need to
investigate.
Finally, the court noted that counsel failed to investigate James’s drug
abuse trajectory, a requirement reinforced by case precedent stressing this
“well-established” part of mitigation research.269 The court again observed
that there were obvious signs of James’s history of polysubstance abuse of a
wide range of drugs, 270 including marijuana, cocaine, and LSD. 271 Moreover, despite counsel’s mitigating argument for diminished capacity based on
James’s LSD intoxication, counsel “failed to appreciate that chronic drug
abuse itself evinces, as well as exacerbates, serious mental illness.” 272
In sum, although there are common themes that resonate among the
ineffective assistance of counsel cases involving neuroscience evidence, 273
the particularized nature of the evidence and the circumstances in which it
is used also invite case studies. Each case study evokes its own doubleedged-sword analysis, but the shared message from the courts is this: it is
critical for attorneys to fully investigate and present mitigation evidence,
particularly in death penalty cases. 274 Neuroscience—in all of its many facets—is an important component of mitigation.
The next Part, however, deals with neuroscience cases that go to the
crux of the double-edged-sword analysis, specifically those situations in
which neuroscience is used not for purposes of mitigation but rather to suggest or validate a defendant’s future dangerousness. 275 Given the emphasis
courts place on mitigation, attorneys must also be aware of the flip side of
what neuroscience can bring to the courtroom.

268

Id. at 808–09. The court quoted the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, stating:

[W]here “counsel was aware that [the defendant] tried to commit suicide in prison
. . . and that he was taking anti-depressant medication at the time of trial,” counsel
“should have retained a mental health expert and provided the expert with the information needed to form an accurate profile of [the defendant’s] mental health.”
Id. (quoting Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2009)).
269
Id. at 809.
270
Id.
271
Id. Particularly relevant on this point was an expert’s opinion that James’s alleged use of
LSD at the time of the murder “‘may have’ compromised James’s capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct.” Id. at 795.
272
Id. at 809.
273
See supra notes 155–272 and accompanying text (exploring six shared themes of ineffective assistance of counsel cases).
274
See James, 679 F.3d at 786; Frierson, 463 F.3d at 989; Hooper, 314 F.3d at 1170;
Stankewitz, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 1106; Simmons, 105 So. 3d at 483.
275
See infra notes 276–448 and accompanying text.
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III. NEUROSCIENCE AND FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS
The majority of death penalty states consider a defendant’s potential
for future dangerousness to be an aggravating factor worthy of consideration during the penalty phase of a capital trial. 276 Indeed, the concept of future dangerousness has garnered substantial attention in recent years. 277 A
major concern is that prosecutors will seek the death penalty based on neuroscience evidence indicating that a defendant is likely to commit future
crimes 278—just as some of the mitigating factors in Strickland cases can be
translated into aggravating factors if defense attorneys are not sufficiently
prepared or careful. 279 Yet the Neuroscience Study found minimal support
for this concern. In those rare instances when prosecutors did utilize neuroscience evidence to suggest a defendant’s propensity to commit crimes, they
typically did so only by building upon the evidence first introduced by a
defense expert. 280
In contrast, some defense attorneys decided to omit potentially mitigating evidence because they thought it may bolster the perception of a client’s
future dangerousness. 281 Such tactics are controversial, as demonstrated by
this Article’s discussion of the Strickland claim cases. As one judge voiced
in a future dangerousness case, “we cannot insulate an unreasonable tactic
not to present mitigating evidence by labeling it a two-edged sword.” 282
Nonetheless, this Part shows that, for a range of reasons, cases involving
neuroscience and future dangerousness typically do not evoke successful

276

See Mitzi Dorland & Daniel Krauss, The Danger of Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing:
Exacerbating the Problem of Arbitrary and Capricious Decision-Making, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL.
REV. 63, 64 (2005). The U.S. Supreme Court has also given prosecutors free reign to use this
evidence. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 165 n.5 (1994) (“The State is free to
argue that the defendant will pose a danger to others in prison and that executing him is the only
means of eliminating the threat to the safety of other inmates or prison staff.”). Although there are
a number of routes for states to follow when incorporating future dangerousness into the penalty
phase, four methods stand out: (1) a state statute can list future dangerousness among its statutory
aggravating factors; (2) a state statute can list a lack of future dangerousness as a statutory mitigating factor; (3) states can enable prosecutors to present future dangerousness “as a non-statutory
aggravating factor” or as one that jurors can weigh in choosing between the defendant’s life or
death; or (4) states can allow “prosecutors to present evidence of future dangerousness in rebuttal
to mitigating evidence presented by the defense alleging non-dangerousness or potential for rehabilitation.” Dorland & Krauss, supra, at 64–65.
277
See infra notes 286–448 and accompanying text.
278
See Snead, supra note 7, at 1318–38.
279
See supra notes 219–244 and accompanying text.
280
See infra notes 328–353 and accompanying text.
281
See infra notes 304–325 and accompanying text.
282
Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1225 (10th Cir. 2003) (Henry, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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Strickland claims. 283 Section A begins with an overview of the Neuroscience Study’s future dangerousness cases, 284 and Section B examines the
trends, themes, and controversies among them. 285
A. How Cases Involve Neuroscience
Among the Neuroscience Study’s 553 Defendant Cases, only 80 cases
(14.47%) feature any discussion of future dangerousness related to the defendant, as Chart 7 shows. 286 Most of this discussion did not involve neuroscience evidence, but instead relied upon other kinds of evidence or testimony, such as a warden’s personal assessment of the defendant’s behavior
as an inmate. 287 Indeed, as Chart 7 indicates, only 39 cases featured a discussion of future dangerousness that was driven, even in part, by an examination of neuroscience evidence (7.05% of the 553 Defendant Cases and
48.75% of the 80 future dangerousness cases).
Of these 39 cases, 14 cases—all of which were capital murder cases—
featured a discussion of neuroscience that was intended to establish the future dangerousness of the defendant. 288 In addition, three of those fourteen
cases contain references to future dangerousness that are only indirect or
implied, rather than explicit.289 In yet another case, the court upheld the
283

See infra notes 284–448 and accompanying text. At the same time, the Neuroscience
Study’s sample is so small that it is difficult to generalize and the reasons for this outcome have
less to do with double-edged-sword concerns than other sorts of doctrines and protections.
284
See infra notes 286–296 and accompanying text.
285
See infra notes 297–325 and accompanying text.
286
See infra Chart 7; Stat. App., supra note 38; DENNO, supra note 38.
287
See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38.
288
See Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1243; Wesbrook v. Thaler, 585 F.3d 245, 255 (5th Cir. 2009); Smith
v. Workman, 550 F.3d 1258, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008); Lorraine v. Coyle, 291 F.3d 416, 424 (6th Cir.
2002); Walls v. McNeil, No. 3:06CV237/MCR, 2009 WL 3187066, at *24 (N.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d,
658 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2011); Maldonado v. Thaler, 662 F. Supp. 2d 684, 752 (S.D. Tex. 2009),
aff’d, 625 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2010); Dowthitt v. Johnson, 180 F. Supp. 2d 832, 861 (S.D. Tex. 2000);
Fleenor v. Farley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1066 (S.D. Ind. 1998), aff’d, 171 F.3d 1096 (7th Cir. 1999);
State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1368 (Conn. 1994); Gudinas v. State, 816 So. 2d 1095, 1103–04 (Fla.
2002); People v. Peeples, 793 N.E.2d 641, 682 (Ill. 2002); Commonwealth v. Stevens, 739 A.2d 507,
528 (Pa. 1999); Coe v. State, 17 S.W.3d 193, 243 (Tenn. 2000), abrogated by State v. Irick, 320
S.W.3d 284 (Tenn. 2010); Ex parte Lucas, 877 S.W.2d 315, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
289
See Lorraine, 291 F.3d at 425; Gudinas, 816 So. 2d at 1104; Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 243. Three
cases involved future dangerousness references that were only implied or inferred in the record, as
opposed to being explicitly referenced as part of the defendant’s case. In two of these cases, references to the defendant’s “future dangerousness” derived from expert medical testimony that was
unrelated to an explicit discussion of the actual statutory aggravator of future dangerousness. In
the first of these two cases, Coe v. State, the State’s expert witness testified that Coe “possibly
could become psychotic in the future.” 17 S.W.3d. at 243. This testimony, however, was only
offered to demonstrate that at the relevant period of time, Coe was in fact competent to be executed. Id. at 248. In the second of these two cases, Gudinas v. State, the only mention of future dangerousness appeared during the court’s review of the defendant’s Strickland claim regarding counsel’s alleged failure to adequately present mitigation evidence during the penalty phase. 816 So.
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Strickland claim concerning future dangerousness, thereby whittling the
total number of successful uses by prosecutors of such evidence to just
ten.290 The Neuroscience Study’s findings thus suggest that overall there is
little likelihood that neuroscience evidence introduced by the defense will
be leveraged by the prosecution in an effort to prove the defendant’s future
dangerousness.
As Chart 7 shows, 291 a Strickland claim was raised in conjunction with
future dangerousness in 33 of the 80 cases (41.25%), and the fourteen future
dangerousness cases based on neuroscience evidence only rarely evoked a
successful Strickland claim. Fourteen cases constitute a small sample, however, and future dangerousness circumstances differ from those cases involving typical Strickland claims. It is therefore difficult to make generalizations or reach broad conclusions linking future dangerousness arguments
to the use of neuroscience evidence in criminal law cases.
One major difference with future dangerousness cases, for example,
concerns the protections afforded to defendants through what is known as
the Simmons jury instruction. 292 The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1994 ruling in
Simmons v. South Carolina293 stipulates that if a prosecutor in a capital case
raises concerns regarding a defendant’s future dangerousness, the jury must
be instructed that life in prison is equivalent to life without the possibility of
parole. 294 Thus, the purpose of a Simmons instruction is to diminish the possibility that a jury will award a defendant the death penalty simply because
of the jury’s concern that a defendant could be a future danger if that defendant is no longer incarcerated.295 As Chart 7 shows, a Simmons instruction was mentioned in 17 of the 80 cases (21.25%) that addressed future
dangerousness.

2d at 1103–04. According to the defense expert’s testimony, Gudinas’s psychological and emotional impairments suggested that he “would probably be a danger to others in the future unless he
was properly treated and that [his crime] was consistent with the behavior of a person with his
psychological makeup.” Id. This testimony, however, was only presented in an attempt to introduce the mental health mitigator of extreme emotional disturbance. Id. at 1106. Notably, trial
counsel testified that their strategy was to “humanize” their client and present him to the jury not
as a monster, but as a person who can be rehabilitated. Id. In the third case, Lorraine v. Coyle, the
only mention of future dangerousness appeared in a footnote that referenced only a portion of the
myriad Strickland claims asserted by the defendant. 291 F.3d at 424 n.4. Specifically, Lorraine
alleged that “[t]rial counsel failed to object to the State’s argument inferring, improperly, future
dangerousness, by calling the Petitioner a ‘psychopath’ in closing argument.” Id. The court found
that this claim was procedurally defaulted and did not address its merits. Id.
290
See infra notes 297–301 and accompanying text.
291
See infra Chart 7.
292
Simmons, 512 U.S. at 171.
293
Id. at 154.
294
Id. at 177 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
295
Id. at 178 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The Neuroscience Study therefore found a limited number of cases
linking the concept of future dangerousness to neuroscience; but those few
cases are intricate and important for a criminal justice system preparing to
accommodate an influx of innovative brain technology and prediction research. 296 Thus, it is critical to understand the kinds of arguments attorneys
raise and the ways courts respond, especially because it becomes clear that
defense attorneys can avoid the threat of potential future dangerousness arguments by preparing and remaining in control of their experts’ testimony.
B. The Specter of the Double-Edged Sword
Among the fourteen future dangerousness cases involving neuroscience evidence, several themes emerge. First, in all but one of the cases, the
court affirmed the defendant’s death sentence. 297 In that case, State v.
Ross, 298 Ross claimed that the court committed harmful error by allowing,
over objection, the State to cross-examine a defense psychiatric expert
about Ross’s potential for future danger if he were released from prison. 299
The court agreed with Ross’s contention that such a cross-examination regarding future dangerousness was outside the scope of what the State was
procedurally allowed to rebut relating to his mitigation case. 300 The court
ultimately affirmed Ross’s convictions, but it reversed and remanded his
death sentence, reasoning that the lower court committed the harmful error. 301
Judicial considerations of future dangerousness vary widely in the remaining thirteen cases, in which the courts affirmed death sentences. Generally, however, the attorneys involved in these thirteen cases demonstrate
far less egregious behavior than the attorneys involved in the Strickland
claim cases discussed in Part II. 302 Neuroscience evidence most commonly
appeared when a court was evaluating a Strickland claim based on trial
counsel’s failure to fully develop that evidence—but courts consistently
rejected defendants’ Strickland claims in this context. 303 Instead, courts fa296

See infra notes 327–448 and accompanying text (discussing the limited case law on the
effect of neuroscience on future dangerousness findings and the importance of the continued use
of such evidence).
297
See Ross, 646 A.2d at 1368 (reversing a death sentence); see also supra notes 288–290 and
accompanying text (discussing the remaining thirteen cases).
298
646 A.2d at 1318.
299
Id. at 1368.
300
Id.
301
Id. at 1373 (“[A defendant] is entitled to have a sentencing jury consider extenuating circumstances that may explain his behavior and mitigate his moral culpability . . . . Because evidentiary rulings by the trial court impaired the defendant’s ability to prove the existence of such mitigating factors, a new sentencing hearing must be held.”).
302
See supra notes 155–272 and accompanying text.
303
See infra notes 305–448 and accompanying text.
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vored a finding of reasonable trial strategy across a variety of purported
strategies. 304 In several cases, the court noted that it was objectively reasonable for counsel not to present certain neuroscience evidence due to the potentially dual nature of the evidence in capital cases as both mitigating and
aggravating. 305
A number of these thirteen cases referred to neuroscience mitigation
evidence as a double-edged sword for this reason. 306 In Bryan v. Mullin, 307
for example, counsel explained why he excluded the mitigating opinions of
two mental health experts who had diagnosed his client as severely psychologically impaired, or crazy, but not insane. 308 Counsel’s concern was that
because his client seemingly had the capacity to form intent, testimony concerning his client’s mental abnormalities would suggest he “was a danger to
society.” 309 As the dissent in Bryan noted, the majority defended counsel’s
decision because, “[g]iven the other evidence of violent behavior, the jury
could have thought this type of psychological problem indicated a propensity for future violence.” 310
Likewise, in Ex parte Lucas, 311 the court noted that Lucas’s mental
impairment, including schizophrenia and continuing psychological trauma
from his abusive childhood, exemplified “evidence which both militates for
and against the death penalty,” and therefore supported counsel’s decision to
omit Lucas’s mental health background. 312 In Maldonado v. Thaler, 313 Maldonado argued that trial counsel failed to present his mental retardation as
mitigation in his capital case. 314 Yet the court rejected Maldonado’s argu-

304

See infra notes 305–448 and accompanying text.
See Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1239 (Henry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Smith,
550 F.3d at 1265; Maldonado, 662 F. Supp. 2d at 752; Dowthitt, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 861; Peeples,
793 N.E.2d at 680; Ex parte Lucas, 877 S.W.2d at 324.
306
See Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1239 (“[Counsel’s] choice not to present the mental health history
at the sentencing stage was reasonable, given his fear of the evidence acting as a two-edged
sword.”); Ex parte Lucas, 877 S.W.2d at 324 (“[A]pplicant may have been less culpable based
upon his emotional and mental problems . . . . [However] such evidence was a two-edged sword in
that it might diminish applicant’s blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates that there is a
probability that he will be dangerous in the future.”).
307
335 F.3d at 1207 (majority opinion).
308
Id. at 1218.
309
Id. at 1231 (Henry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
310
Id. at 1243; see also Peeples, 793 N.E.2d at 659 (holding that evidence of frontal lobe
damage resulting in poor decision making, irrational behavior, as well as a history of psychological impairment including a quick and violent temper, may “‘tend to show the court that [defendant] is, in fact, dangerous,’ as well as ‘his capacity for future conduct,’” as opposed to mitigating
future dangerousness).
311
877 S.W.2d at 315.
312
See id. at 319 (internal quotations omitted).
313
662 F. Supp. 2d at 684.
314
Id. at 752.
305
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ment, quoting Atkins v. Virginia 315 as support: 316 “reliance on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance
the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be
found by the jury.” 317 Thus, counsel’s omission of mental retardation evidence as a basis for mitigation “can be reasonable in order to prevent a negative jury finding on issue of future dangerousness.” 318
In two cases, the courts praised attorneys for presenting evidence of
mental illness even though defendants in both cases expressly requested that
counsel not present such evidence. 319 In Bryan, 320 for example, the court
held that trial counsel had used an acceptable strategy when introducing
evidence of mental illness, despite being forbidden by his client from mentioning any such evidence and being informed that his client would not accept a guilty plea—even to avoid a death sentence.321 Similarly, in Dowthitt
v. Johnson, 322 Dowthitt not only consistently denied having a history of
mental illness, but also showed no symptoms of mental or emotional disorders. 323 His attorney nonetheless retained a psychiatrist to examine
Dowthitt, but the psychiatrist advised counsel not to have him testify on
Dowthitt’s behalf given the psychiatrist’s own conflicting views of
Dowthitt’s future dangerousness. 324 The court upheld as reasonable counsel’s compliance with this request.325
It is clear, therefore, that the theme of the double-edged sword in future dangerousness cases is pervasive. An analysis of particular cases further demonstrates how this theme resonates. The next Section closely analyzes the details of such cases given their relevance to the future use of neuroscience technology in court.326
C. How Cases Involve Dangerousness
This Section examines five particularly insightful future dangerousness
cases, focusing specifically on how courts view future dangerousness in the

315
536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding the execution of mentally retarded individuals unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment).
316
Maldonado, 662 F. Supp. 2d at 752.
317
Id. (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321).
318
Id.
319
Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1120; Dowthitt, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 859.
320
335 F.3d at 1207.
321
Id. at 1220.
322
180 F. Supp. 2d at 832.
323
Id. at 859.
324
Id. at 861.
325
Id.
326
See infra notes 327–448 and accompanying text.
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context of a double-edged-sword analysis. 327 These cases illustrate the
murky line between what courts do and do not consider acceptable.
1. Unanticipated Expert Testimony
In Fleenor v. Farley, 328 Fleenor petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
following the court’s affirmance of his murder conviction and death sentence. 329 Fleenor primarily contended that his attorneys mishandled available neuroscience evidence and arguments during the penalty phase. 330
Fleenor’s attorneys attempted to show at the penalty phase that Fleenor was
mentally abnormal and that his crimes were attributable to his mental illness, extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and/or the consequences of
his intoxication from alcohol.331 Yet, under cross-examination, the prosecution attempted to undercut much of this evidence. 332 Particularly damaging
to Fleenor was the testimony provided by two experts—Dr. G.B., a courtappointed psychiatrist, and Dr. P.C., a psychologist that defense counsel
chose. 333 During the prosecutor’s cross examination of Dr. G.B., for example, Dr. G.B. stated that “if given the chance in the future, Fleenor would
‘continue to involve himself in similar behavior in the future,’”—an opinion
that the prosecutor then stressed and repeated to the jury. 334 Dr. P.C. also
provided dangerousness projections about Fleenor’s behavior. 335 In his
view, “Fleenor was ‘not psychotic’ but that, under extreme stress, someone
with borderline personality disorder [like Fleenor] [could] exhibit psychotic
symptoms.” 336 Fleenor’s attorneys referred to this characterization of
Fleenor as a “transient psychotic episode,” but on cross-examination Dr.
P.C. bolstered the prosecution’s case with the following statements:
“Fleenor was not psychotic and not insane, but mentally ill,” and Fleenor’s
327

See infra notes 328–448 and accompanying text.
Fleenor, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 1023–24; Fleenor v. State, 622 N.E.2d 140, 154 (Ind. 1993),
abrogated by Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230 (Ind. 2001).
329
Fleenor, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 1035. Although there are numerous issues that arise in this
doctrinally rich case, this overview focuses on a few selected challenges that Fleenor faced in an
attempt to prove a Strickland claim in the context of neuroscience evidence of future dangerousness. See id. at 1035–37, 1066–72.
330
Id.
331
Id. at 1036. These arguments were similar to those presented at the guilt phase. See id.
Evidence at Fleenor’s guilt-phase of the trial included testimony from two court-appointed psychiatrists (including Dr. G.B.) and testimony from a psychologist selected by defense counsel (Dr.
P.C.). Id. Testimony at the penalty phase included an expert with a doctorate in sociology and a
background in counseling alcoholics. Id.
332
Id.
333
Id.
334
Id. at 1037.
335
Id. at 1036.
336
Id. at 1066.
328
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personality disorder was a long term condition that would be “‘quite resistant to treatment.’” 337
Taken together, the testimony from both experts fueled the prosecutor’s assessment of Fleenor’s likely future violence, especially during his
closing argument. 338 According to Fleenor, however, the prosecutor had
engaged in misconduct during his closing argument by offering an expert’s
opinion to the jury, which violated Fleenor’s Sixth Amendment rights. 339 In
particular, Fleenor argued that although he and his attorneys knew that Dr.
G.B. would be evaluating Fleenor’s sanity and competency to stand trial,
they had no idea that he would also contribute testimony during trial regarding Fleenor’s future dangerousness. 340 In rejecting Fleenor’s claims and affirming his death sentence, the court ultimately explained that, given the
type of testimony offered, counsel was aware that “the nature of any mental
disorder or behavioral problem would be explored in detail, including any
persistent and continuing patterns of violent conduct.” 341 Likewise, it was
not “unreasonable or unfair” for the prosecution to attempt to rebut expert
testimony that Fleenor’s antisocial personality disorder could be controlled,
especially because the defense set forth mental health and other mitigating
evidence at the penalty phase. 342
That said, in multiple ways the prosecutor’s closing argument demonstrated the effects of the future dangerousness testimony and the doubleedged nature of the mental illness testimony presented in this case. 343 Referring to Fleenor as an “‘animal’” and repeatedly as “‘the enemy,’” the prosecutor continuously stressed the “right” and need for individuals to “protect”
themselves from “‘people who kill and kill again.’” 344 The prosecutor also
emphasized the obligation to protect “‘the prison guards that have to deal
with this man,’” as well as the “‘jail dispatchers’” and the “‘people in this
[court]room.’” 345 By declining this call to defend, the prosecutor argued,
society will have “‘lost its ability to stand up against the blackness and
against the enemy.’” 346
Other factors also worked against Fleenor’s efforts either to raise a
Strickland claim or to highlight the potential impact of future dangerousness

337

Id.
Id. at 1036, 1066.
339
Id. at 1069.
340
Id.
341
Id. at 1071.
342
Id. at 1072.
343
See id. at 1059.
344
Id.
345
Id.
346
Id.
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testimony. 347 In contrast to Part II’s accounts of attorney deficiencies, 348 for
example, the court ultimately rejected Fleenor’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. 349 Not only had Fleenor’s attorneys devoted more than 1000
hours of time both before and during Fleenor’s trial, the court had also
characterized them as “two skilled, experienced, and tenacious lawyers who
fought to save [Fleenor’s] life.” 350 Thus, counsel’s representation of Fleenor
at both the guilt and penalty phases of trial was well above the constitutional floor set in Strickland.351
Indeed, as the remaining case studies indicate, attorneys in these future
dangerousness cases are relatively more prepared and professional than the
attorneys discussed in Part II’s Strickland claim cases. 352 As a result, a defendant-petitioner’s challenges against future dangerousness arguments can
lose steam when attorneys are otherwise covering their legal bases. That
said, as the dissent in the following case study compellingly argues, not
everyone agrees that these attorneys are providing effective representation. 353
2. The Slide From Mitigation to Danger
In Bryan, 354 Bryan appealed a district court decision denying his petition for habeas relief from his conviction of first-degree murder and attendant death sentence. 355 Bryan contended in his Strickland claim that his
attorney failed to present available evidence of Bryan’s mental impairment
and that Bryan was therefore prejudiced.356 The court ultimately rejected
Bryan’s claim, 357 but on appeal Bryan offered a vast range of evidence regarding his alleged mental abnormalities. 358 These included “organic brain
disease” potentially linked to “his severe case of diabetes mellitus,” 359 a
347

See id. at 1049.
See supra notes 155–272 and accompanying text.
349
Fleenor, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. Among other things, Fleenor contended that his attorneys
were deficient for failing to present a neuropsychologist and/or a neurologist’s testimony that
Fleenor suffered from frontal lobe damage resulting in “‘disinhibition or poor impulse control in
addition to neurocognitive deficits and dysfunction that impaired [Fleenor’s] reason, judgment and
problem solving ability.’” Id. at 1038.
350
Id. at 1049.
351
Id.
352
See supra 155–272 and accompanying text.
353
See Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1225 (Henry J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
354
335 F.3d at 1207.
355
Id. at 1210–11.
356
Id. at 1217–23.
357
Id. at 1223–24.
358
Id. at 1210–13.
359
Id. at 1212 (noting, for example, that in 1989 “Bryan was diagnosed as suffering from an
organic delusional disorder and was considered severely psychotic at the time of his admission to
the hospital”).
348
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“delusional system and circumstantiality of thought,” 360 as well as a “serious mental disorder.” 361 Indeed, Bryan’s Strickland claim contended that
counsel failed to present this evidence or any other mental health evidence
on his behalf. 362 Contrary to Fleenor, then, the issue in Bryan was one of
counsel choosing to omit evidence rather than counsel insufficiently anticipating the content of testimony already admitted into court.363
Counsel contended, however, that he had limited options during Bryan’s guilt phase, a position the court seemingly took to heart. 364 For example, the court concluded that Bryan’s counsel lacked the medical evidence
necessary to adequately argue an insanity plea. 365 Moreover, Bryan himself
explicitly did not want his counsel to present evidence portraying him as
mentally ill.366 Finally, Bryan told counsel that he would not accept a guilty
plea, even if doing so meant avoiding the death sentence.367 For all of these
reasons, the court determined that counsel utilized sound strategy during the
guilt phase. 368
Regarding Bryan’s penalty-phase Strickland claims, the court similarly
held that counsel’s decision to omit evidence of organic brain dysfunction
and mental impairment for mitigation purposes was a reasonable trial strategy. 369 Counsel explained that introducing such evidence on Bryan’s behalf
would have done “more harm than good.” 370 Specifically, counsel believed
that testimony by either of Bryan’s medical experts “might play into the
prosecution’s case that Bryan was a continuing threat to society.” 371

360

Id. at 1213 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
362
Id. With respect to the guilt phase, Bryan contended that his attorney should have presented the readily available evidence of his mental dysfunction to support an insanity defense or a
second-degree murder instruction. Id. at 1217. According to Bryan, a swath of information cast
doubt on his ability to form the intent to kill at the time the crime was committed, including the
opinions of two medical experts, the information revealed from the CAT and SPECT scans of his
brain, and his earlier records from the Eastern State Hospital. Id. Bryan also claimed that much of
the evidence that was actually introduced was circumstantial, such as evidence “indicating that
Bryan’s physical condition had so deteriorated at the time of the murder, due to his diabetes, that
he was physically incapable of carrying out this crime.” Id. at 1219. Nonetheless, the court found
that Bryan’s contention that his attorney should have pursued an insanity defense was completely
unsubstantiated by prior counsel’s representation in the case, the available medical documentation,
and Bryan’s own wish to avoid the insanity plea. Id.
363
See Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1213; Fleenor, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 1069.
364
Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1219–20.
365
Id. at 1218.
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Id. at 1219.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 1222–23.
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The dissent’s response to the majority’s argument, however, emphatically rejected the double-edged-sword argument: “Mr. Bryan’s counsel provided the most ineffective defense I have ever seen . . . . [His] reasoning is
untenable.”372 Unlike the majority, the dissent found counsel’s decision to
omit the available mental health mitigation completely non-strategic, 373 particularly counsel’s fear “that the mental health testimony might be viewed
to support future dangerousness.” 374 The dissent first reviewed the vast
amount of mitigation evidence available to Bryan’s trial counsel based on
extensive testing, especially stressing the SPECT scan results showing Bryan’s extensive brain damage. 375 In the dissent’s view, this evidence also
strengthened expert testimony that Bryan was “crazy” and suffered from
“paranoid,” “grandiose,” and “persecutory” thinking. 376
The dissent then contended that despite trial counsel’s “purported familiarity” with Bryan’s medical history, counsel seemingly believed “the
better tack was to pretend Mr. Bryan was a perfectly normal defendant who
was in a bad spot,” rather than present the evidence in mitigation. 377 Questioning counsel’s concern that, because Bryan could apparently form intent,
“any testimony regarding his mental distress would indicate that Mr. Bryan
was a danger to society,” 378 the dissent concluded that counsel failed to
comprehend that psychiatric evidence (as well as SPECT scan evidence)
could both mitigate and dissipate the strength of aggravating factors. 379
Moreover, the majority failed to consider that a defendant can be competent to stand trial yet still demonstrate mental health disorders that a judge
and jury should be able to assess. 380 In the context of these arguments, the
dissent thoroughly analyzed and critiqued the potential for neuroscience
evidence to be viewed as a double-edged sword. 381 The dissent noted that
the majority defended counsel’s decision to omit the available mental health
evidence as mitigation because “[g]iven the other evidence of violent behavior, the jury could have thought this type of psychological problem indi372

Id. at 1225 (Henry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1243–44. “Strickland counsels deference to plausible legal strategies, not to unilateral disarmament.” Id. at 1243.
374
Id. at 1225. The dissent also stressed that Bryan had three defense attorneys before his
elderly parents mortgaged their home in order to hire the attorney at issue, who charged the parents $50,000 for his services. Id. at 1225–26. As the dissent lamented, “[h]ad the Bryans not tried
to help, paradoxically, I believe that Leroy Bryan would not be facing execution today.” Id. at
1226.
375
Id. at 1126–32.
376
Id. at 1131.
377
Id. at 1227.
378
Id. at 1231.
379
Id. at 1231–32.
380
Id. at 1231.
381
See id. at 1243–44.
373
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cated a propensity for future violence.” 382 Yet the dissent found it far more
important for the jury to hear all the critical evidence about Bryan’s history
of mental disorders, organic disease, and treatment, as well as a previous
conviction for which he was initially found to be incompetent.383
Had the jury been presented with a full set of evidence, the dissent believed that there was a reasonable probability that Bryan would not have
received the death penalty because the jury had the option of sentencing
Bryan to life without parole. 384 In essence, counsel’s tactics left the jury
devoid of any argument that Bryan may not be sufficiently culpable for the
death penalty despite Bryan’s brain abnormalities.385 Thus, in the dissent’s
eyes, counsel’s assistance at trial was constitutionally ineffective under
Strickland. 386
3. The Special Case of Mental Retardation
In Maldonado, 387 Maldonado was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. 388 His death sentence was affirmed on appeal, and after the
State dismissed his petition for habeas relief, Maldonado filed for federal
habeas relief. 389 Maldonado contended first that his mental retardation precluded his execution, and second, that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by neglecting to investigate his mental retardation and additional
mitigating evidence. 390 The court ultimately denied Maldonado’s petition
and granted summary judgment for the State. 391
According to Maldonado, his trial counsel’s failure to investigate and
present information concerning his mental retardation 392 was a critical
omission because such evidence would have diminished the impact of his
confession in the guilt phase and also provided strong mitigation in the penalty phase. 393 Due to major debates at trial among medical experts regarding
Maldonado’s intellectual abilities, however, the court found that Maldonado
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Id. at 1243.
Id.
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Id.
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See id.
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Id. (“The compelling and extensive evidence of Mr. Bryan’s history of mental illness creates a reasonable probability that the jury would have concluded that the mitigating evidence outweighed the continuing threat aggravator and might also be viewed in a mitigating light as to past
violent behavior.”).
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662 F. Supp. 2d at 684.
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Id. at 689.
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Id. at 689–90.
390
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was not sufficiently “subaverage” 394 and therefore had not demonstrated his
counsel’s ineffectiveness. 395
Next, Maldonado argued that trial counsel performed deficiently and
prejudicially in declining to present his mental retardation as a mitigating factor against his death sentence. 396 The court, in reviewing this claim, noted the
potential threat of future dangerousness and the challenges attorneys confront
when considering whether to introduce mental retardation in the penalty
phase. 397 In Atkins, 398 for example, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged
that a jury could view mental retardation as both a mitigating factor and an
aggravating factor predictive of a defendant’s future dangerousness. 399 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit had similarly embraced this double-edged-sword concept, holding that a trial attorney’s decision to omit mental retardation evidence can be reasonable as a means to preclude a jury’s finding of future dangerousness. 400 Thus, once again, the Maldonado court determined that counsel was not ineffective under Strickland. 401
Regarding the pertinent issue of future dangerousness, the court would
have weighed the aggravating factor of Maldonado’s “violent and lawless
history” against the potentially mitigating evidence of his alleged mental
retardation had trial counsel presented such evidence. 402 As the court explained, this comparison would not have helped Maldonado: “[w]hile low
intelligence may have allowed the jury to find that Maldonado was (as suggested by the facts of the murder) a follower, that evidence also could have
shown him to be a future danger when again encouraged by others to be
violent.” 403 The court emphasized in particular the various ways such evidence could be viewed for good or for ill: “[t]he double-edged nature of the
mitigating evidence would make it not reasonably probable that the jury
would answer the special issues differently had trial counsel emphasized
low intelligence in the punishment phase.”404

394

Id. at 734–35.
Id. at 751.
396
Id. at 752.
397
Id.
398
536 U.S. at 321 (holding that the execution of mentally retarded individuals violates the
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments).
399
Maldonado, 662 F. Supp. 2d at 752 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321).
400
Id.
401
Id. at 752–53 (“The Fifth Circuit has previously found no Strickland prejudice in failing to
present evidence of low IQ because the upper borderline of mild retardation does not amount to
any significant organic damage or mental illness.” (internal quotations omitted)).
402
See id. at 753.
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Ultimately the court held that Maldonado’s claim did not have sufficient merit. 405 While the double-edged-sword concept can appear compelling in theory, such a balance becomes challenging in practice, particularly
when so many other factors pertaining to cognitive deficiency are considered clearly mitigating. 406 As the next case shows, the double-edged-sword
analogy has additional interpretations beyond those discussed so far.
4. The Two Sides of Cognitive Deficiency
In People v. Peeples, 407 defendant-petitioner sought post-conviction relief after the appellate court affirmed his convictions, including first-degree
murder. 408 On a post-conviction appeal, Peeples alleged for the second time
that his counsel was ineffective for neglecting to research and present mitigating evidence pertaining to Peeples’s disturbing family circumstances, his
cognitive deficiencies, and his possible neurological disorders.409
The lower circuit court rejected Peeples’s argument, emphasizing in
particular that not only was such evidence a double-edged sword, it also
leaned in favor of future dangerousness. 410 Specifically, the court held that
the “additional mitigation evidence regarding defendant’s family background and psychological condition ‘would tend to show the court that [defendant] is, in fact, dangerous,’ as well as ‘his capacity for future conduct.’” 411 Such evidence, therefore, would not necessarily be viewed as mitigating. 412
The opinion also noted that Peeples’s attorneys did make some effort
to gather and present mitigation evidence, as demonstrated by their request
for a continuance between the guilt phase and penalty phase.413 In particular, counsel discovered that Peeples had been injured in a car accident several years prior to the case and had suffered spinal meningitis in his youth,
both of which “may have affected [Peeples’s] brain.” 414 Moreover, counsel
demonstrated sound trial strategy in utilizing their witnesses to account for
Peeples’s social background at the mitigation stage, thereby blunting the
effect of Peeples’s potential for future danger. 415 As the court stated, “[t]he
record shows that defense counsel made a strategic choice to argue that
405

Id.
See supra notes 155–272 and accompanying text.
407
793 N.E.2d at 641.
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Id. at 654.
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Id. at 655.
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there were ‘two William Peeples. The William Peeples that family and
friends knew and the William Peeples that the jury convicted of murder.’” 416
In addition, counsel had, while presenting mitigation, emphasized Peeples’s
positive characteristics and requested that the judge regard Peeples as
someone whose life had value and who deserved forgiveness. 417
Ultimately, the court concluded that Peeples sufficiently demonstrated
under Strickland prong 1 that trial counsel was constitutionally deficient for
failing to investigate and present the mitigating evidence of Peeples’s cognitive deficiency. 418 The court also found, however, that counsel’s deficiency
did not prejudice Peeples under Strickland prong 2, so Peeples’s claim
failed. 419
In an attempt to explain its denial of prong 2, the court cited its own
precedent regarding future dangerousness and the double-edged nature of
certain mental health mitigation evidence.420 Essentially, the precedent holds
that when a jury considers evidence of mental dysfunction, the jury may
find such evidence mitigating or aggravating “depending, of course, on
whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion
or demonstrates possible future dangerousness.” 421 In rejecting Peeples’s
claim that the evidence of mental impairment would have been mitigating,
the court reasoned that one of the expert witness’s reports “may have been
harmful” to Peeples’s arguments because it stated that Peeples’s academic
achievement was at the high school level.422 Further, Peeples’s “‘recollection of past events tend[ed] to ‘normalize’ his experience’” because Peeples
“‘minimized or denied’” so many of his life’s problems. 423 Without providing any scientific justification for its conclusion, the court weighed all these
factors negatively; that is, in the court’s view, had the jury heard such evidence about Peeples’s mental impairments, in addition to Peeples’s history
of violent behavior, “the sentencer could have reasonably concluded that
this evidence demonstrated [Peeples’s] future dangerousness.” 424
The court also rejected Peeples’s Strickland claim regarding his disturbing family background, which Peeples contended should have been presented in mitigation, because the court believed the information contained
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“powerful evidence of defendant’s future dangerousness.” 425 For example,
“the evidence reveals that, throughout his life, defendant had a quick and
violent temper, and that this violence animated his relationships with his
family, friends, and, most especially, with women.” 426 For all these reasons,
the court determined that what Peeples viewed as mitigation could have just
as easily, and perhaps even more likely, been viewed as aggravating evidence by a reasonable jury. 427 Therefore, trial counsel’s failure to produce
such evidence, even if constitutionally deficient, did not prejudice Peeples
under Strickland. 428
Similar to the other future dangerousness cases, however, the court
provided no documentation or support for its conclusions beyond simple
speculation or, in some instances, remote prior precedent. All of the evidence that Peeples deemed relevant for mitigation was, by contrast, considered critical by the courts discussed in Part II’s Strickland claim cases.
5. The Role of Psychiatric Experts
In Smith v. Workman, 429 Smith was convicted of first degree murder
and sentenced to death.430 Smith’s first petition for habeas relief was denied
in state court, and he subsequently appealed to the court under review here
for habeas relief. 431
Smith first argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request
an Ake expert at the mitigation stage.432 In 1985, in Ake v. Oklahoma, 433 the
U.S. Supreme Court held that “when a defendant demonstrates to the trial
judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at
trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist.” 434 With respect to the mitigation stage of the trial, the
Court determined that the State is obligated to provide a defendant a psychiatric expert “when the State presents psychiatric evidence of the defendant’s future dangerousness.” 435 According to Smith, Ake applies “when any
evidence of future dangerousness is introduced,” not just psychiatric evidence. 436 Therefore, in Smith’s view, his counsel was ineffective for not
425
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requesting an Ake expert despite the State’s decision to exclude psychiatric
evidence of Smith’s future dangerousness. 437
The court found that Smith’s argument was correct on the merits because the State did present evidence of future dangerousness as an aggravating factor.438 Smith’s claim failed, however, because of its timing. 439 As the
court noted, Smith’s case was tried and his sentence was handed down during a period when the courts in Oklahoma interpreted Ake very narrowly;
specifically, Ake was applied only when the State introduced expert psychiatric evidence to demonstrate future dangerousness. 440 Thus, counsel’s failure to call an Ake expert when Smith’s trial took place did not adequately
support a Strickland claim even though, had the failure occurred at the time
of the Tenth Circuit appeal, it would have. 441
Smith also asserted that counsel failed to adequately investigate and
present readily available mitigation evidence—specifically, “evidence of
deprivation, neglect, physical abuse, psychological problems, addiction, and
brain damage.” 442 The court accepted, however, counsel’s contention that
omitting certain kinds of evidence about Smith was a reasonable strategic
decision because such information “might actually enhance rather than mitigate the State’s argument that [Smith] presented a continuing threat.” 443 In
addition to detailing counsel’s investigation and presentation of mitigation
at trial, the court also emphasized that counsel was “understandably reluctant” to present specific mitigation witnesses and evidence.444 In particular,
counsel testified that he did not want mitigation witnesses to “open the
door” to Smith’s “lifetime propensity for fighting,” which would have supported an aggravating factor of future dangerousness. 445 The court concluded that despite the evidence that could have been introduced, such as childhood abuse, “addiction problems, psychological problems, brain injury and
borderline intelligence,” Smith’s counsel did not perform unreasonably un-
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der the circumstances.446 Therefore, the court affirmed Smith’s death sentence. 447
Smith is an unusual case because it is based, in part, on the interpretation of legal decisions that have since been expanded to broaden the scope
of Ake. 448 In addition, Ake is an important Supreme Court decision that provides some protection for defendants involved in future dangerousness cases. That said, like the other cases in this Section, the evidence at issue in
Smith could just as easily be regarded as mitigating.
Overall, then, this Part discussed the future dangerousness cases focusing on the contradictions presented by the double-edged-sword concept. On
the one hand, courts urge attorneys to fully investigate and present mitigating evidence such as neuroscience; they discipline those who fail to do so
under appropriate circumstances, especially when defendants face a death
sentence. On the other hand, in a limited number of cases, courts also accept
arguments that neuroscience evidence can be indicative of a defendant’s
future dangerousness. The justifications for future dangerousness arguments
are complex and varied, but they should not be ignored. Neuroscience evidence overwhelmingly occupies the halls of mitigation—hence the myth of
the double-edged sword—but danger can lie at the ends of those halls and
attorneys should be prepared for it.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, the increasing acceptance of neuroscience evidence in
the criminal justice system has spurred controversy, raising questions about
how such evidence is applied. This Article tackles those questions by analyzing my unprecedented empirical Study of the 800 criminal cases that
446

See id. According to Smith’s counsel, Smith and his family hindered his efforts to investigate Smith’s history of “drugs, abuse, and mental illness.” Id. at 1272. In light of “the apparent
good faith in which the counsel conducted the investigation and the lack of transparency on the
part of his primary sources of information [Smith and his family members],” the court determined
that counsel’s performance was reasonable. Id.
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Id. at 1274.
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See Fitzgerald v. State, 972 P.2d 1157, 1169 n.43 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (explaining that
the interpretation of Ake had “significantly changed” since its “narrowest possible construction”
was used in Brewer v. State, which held that Ake merely requires a psychologist to be appointed
when the State introduces an expert to testify about a defendant’s future dangerousness); Brewer
v. State, 718 P.2d 354, 363–64 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), overruling recognized by Fitzgerald, 972
F.2d at 1169 n.43; see also Rogers v. Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that,
under Ake, a defendant is entitled to have a psychological expert appointed when a defendant
shows that the state introduced any evidence—even if it was not an expert—relating to the defendant's future dangerousness, and defendant's “mental condition was likely to be a significant
mitigating factor” at trial); Liles v. Saffle, 945 F.2d 333, 340 (10th Cir. 1991) (expanding Brewer
by holding that, under Ake, a defendant is entitled to have a psychological expert appointed when
a defendant can show that “his sanity was likely ‘to be a significant factor at trial’” even if the
State does not introduce an expert to testify about the defendant’s future dangerousness).
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addressed neuroscience evidence over the course of two decades (1992–
2012). The Study’s results suggest that not only is much of the controversy
concerning the role of neuroscience unwarranted, but also that the use of
such evidence has been misunderstood. Neuroscience is often viewed as a
“double-edged sword,” capable both of lessening and enhancing a defendant’s blameworthiness; yet, that view fuels myths that neuroscience will
either justify the freeing of violent criminals or bolster unjust predictions
regarding defendants’ future dangerousness.
My Study reveals a criminal justice system that accepts both the
strengths and limitations of neuroscience evidence in ways that discredit the
myth of the double-edged sword. For example, results show that neuroscience evidence is usually offered to mitigate punishments in the way that
traditional criminal law has always allowed, and to provide fact-finders
with more complete, reliable, and precise information when determining a
defendant’s fate. Likewise, the Study uncovers a criminal justice system
that is willing to accept modern methods of assessing defendants’ mental
capabilities, and expects its attorneys to do the same. Indeed one of the
Study’s most striking findings concerns the parameters of ineffective assistance of counsel claims: courts not only expect attorneys to investigate and
use available neuroscience evidence in their cases when it is appropriate,
but they penalize attorneys who neglect this obligation.
This Article further examines one of the most widely held myths about
the double-edged sword—that prosecutors will use neuroscience evidence
to fuel arguments that a defendant is a future danger and therefore deserves
death or extensive incarceration. To the contrary, however, my Study found
that neuroscience evidence is only rarely used to bolster a defendant’s future dangerousness and that prosecutors employ a variety of purported strategies in making such arguments. Indeed, as courts continue to support neuroscience tools and raise new questions, my Study’s empirical data will
provide a foundation for discussions regarding the use of neuroscience evidence in criminal cases. The findings presented in this Article will also ensure that those discussions are grounded in fact rather than hyperbole.
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